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Abstract
The use of formal specifications allows for a software system to be defined
with stringent mathematical semantics and syntax via such tools as propositional
calculus and set theory. There are many perceived benefits garnered from formal
specifications, such as a thorough and in-depth understanding of the domain and
system being specified and a reduction in user requirement ambiguity. Probably the
greatest benefit of formal specifications, and that which is least capitalized upon, is
that mathematical proof procedures can be used to test and prove internal consistency and syntactic correctness in an effort to ensure comprehensive validation and
verification (V&V). The automation of the proof process will make formal methods
far more attractive by reducing the time required and the effort involved in the V&V
of software systems.
It is commonly perceived that since a formal specification is written using
strict mathematical notation, it is a minor task to ensure that the product does in
fact meet the original specification and that the specification meets the end user's
requirements. This is not the case. The majority of research in formal methods has
delved into the development of formal notation and inference rules.
The emphasis of this research is the validation and verification of formal objectoriented (00) specifications. This research identifies elements and properties of
formally specified 00 systems that should be proved and why, and implements such
proofs using the theorem prover Z/Eves and process modeling tool SPIN. Proofs
relating to the functional, dynamic and structural object models are addressed. The
00 paradigm used during this research is that of Rumbaugh's Object Modeling
Technique (OMT).

xm

XIV

Validation and Verification of Formal Specifications in
Object-Oriented Software Engineering

/. Introduction
A key element to force multiplication is technology. A technological edge over an
opponent in conflict can be the difference between success and failure. As software
intensive systems employed by the military continue to become more complex, it
is apparent that the ability to formally specify future systems and comprehensively
validate and verify them is of growing import to the defense community.
Formal methods are used infrequently today, but their wider application is
envisioned "to lead to increased software quality and reliability. Moreover [it is expected that] early verification of specifications [will] increase specification quality,
thereby reducing life cycle costs" [Fräser]. Rectification of errors during code maintenance is typically 60 to 100 times more costly than modification of the errant
specification [Pressman].
Engineering can be thought of as the application of scientific approaches in
order to solve technical problems. In more established engineering disciplines, the use
of scientific approaches and formal processes is well established. Not so with software
engineering, which is still in its relatively early stages of development. The use of
formal methods in software engineering will help transform software engineering from
its current state into that of a more structured and scientific approach to problem
solution.
The use of formal specifications allows for a system to be defined with stringent
mathematical semantics and syntax via such tools as propositional calculus and set
theory. There are many perceived benefits garnered from formal specifications, such

as a thorough and in-depth understanding of the domain and system being specified
and a reduction in user requirement ambiguity. Formal specifications may be applied
to systems in any domain, and are not necessarily limited to software specification.
Validation is intended to ensure that a system meets the user's requirements
while verification refers to ensuring that a system meets its specification. V&V has
in common with other facets of software engineering the fact that it should be carried
out over the duration of a project and not just simply upon implemented systems.
This is in contrast to most developed validation approaches for Knowledge Based
Software Engineering (KBSE) [Meseguer] that perform validation almost entirely
post completion.
Probably the greatest benefit of formal specifications, and that which is least
capitalized upon, is that mathematical proof procedures can be used to "test (and
prove) internal consistency and syntactic correctness" [Fräser] to ensure comprehensive V&V. The automation of the proof process will make formal methods far more
attractive by reducing the time required and the effort involved in V&V of software
systems.

1.1

Problem
The benefits of formal specifications are well understood in software engineer-

ing.

How all of these benefits are realized is not as well understood.

It is true

that simply by attempting to formally specify a system and its domain we gain a
more in-depth understanding by having to ensure that what could otherwise be an
ambiguously written specification is a properly formed collection of definitions and
axioms, but this argument provides only the tip of the iceberg of what benefits formal
specifications offer us.
It is commonly perceived that since a formal specification is written using
strict mathematical notation, it is a minor task to ensure that the product does in
fact meet the original specification and that the specification meets the end user's

requirements. This is not the case. The majority of research in formal methods has
delved into the "development of formal notation and inference rules" [Fräser].
It is the intent of this research to investigate what elements and properties of a
formal specification should be proved and why, and contrast this with what is typically proved in practice. This research will also deal with methods of implementation
of such proofs.
The emphasis of this research is the validation and verification of formal objectoriented specifications. Proofs relating to the functional, dynamic and structural object models are addressed. One approach to be followed is the integration of existing
tools into the AFIT Wide Spectrum Object Modeling Environment (AWSOME).
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has developed AWSOME in order
to build software based upon formal specifications via semi-automated, correctness
preserving transforms. Examples of tools that could be integrated with AWSOME
include an object editor [Ashby], theorem prover or, for the dynamic model, a finite
state machine analysis tool.
As examples of what could be proved, consider an object-oriented class with
its requisite structural, dynamic and functional models as defined by the Object
Modeling Technique (OMT) [Rumbaugh]. In the dynamic model we can ensure that
states referenced are actually defined, and that there are no states for which the
class is incapable of satisfying the guard conditions required for transition.
The functional model defines methods in terms of preconditions and postconditions. Functional model processes describe changes in the state of an object. They
can be tested to ensure that invariant conditions are maintained after state transition, and that specified preconditions are satisfied whenever methods are called.
Verification of the structural model could include testing to ensure the concepts
of inheritance and aggregation are implemented correctly, for example, ensuring that
a subclass does not overload any attribute names used by its superclass(es).

1.1.1

Problem Statement.

Propose a set of constraints via which formally

specified object-oriented systems may be verified. Provide demonstrative examples
of the applicability of the constraints to a formally specified 00 system.

1.2

Scope
Research focus is upon formal specifications of object-oriented software em-

phasizing the investigation of existing techniques and addressing their shortcomings
in order to propose new techniques. Illustrative implementation is achieved through
verification of an object-oriented system modeled in AWSOME via the addition of
a verification methodology to the AWSOME environment.

1.3

Approach
The approach is designed so as to address existing theories and practices in the

proof of formal specifications, identify the key concepts of object-oriented analysis
that require verification, and provide illustrative examples, preferably via integration
of a commercially available, off-the-shelf (COTS) dynamic model verifier and COTS
theorem prover.
The 00 specification that this research uses was formalized using practices
followed by AFIT's Knowledge Based Software Engineering (KBSE) group for the
generation of formal specifications of object-oriented models [Hartrum].
Examples of proposed theories are implemented upon AWSOME analysis models as AWSOME caters to the creation of domain models from formal specifications
via the use of the AWSOME Wide Spectrum Language (AWL). An AWSOME analysis model is represented and manipulated internally as an abstract syntax tree
(AST).
The primary illustrative example used throughout this document is a modified
version of a cruise missile system specified by a group of AFIT students. This model
is contained at Appendix B.

A

1.4

Topics Addressed
The fields addressed in this document include object-oriented analysis, for-

mal specifications, validation and verification, Z and an associated theorem prover
Z/Eves, and the process modeling language Promela and an associated dynamic
model checker Spin.

1.5

Products of This Research
The products of this research include:
• a list of formal constraints to which an object-oriented analysis model must
conform in order to satisfy the definitions of correctness, completeness, and
consistency defined in Chapter Two,
• an AWSOME analysis model visitor that generates Z specifications from the
analysis model with integrated theorem prover commands (for the Z based
theorem prover Z/Eves) to simplify the process of verification,
• an AWSOME analysis model visitor that generates Promela syntax process
models from the dynamic characteristics specified. The visitor also integrates
dynamic model checking commands for the Promela based process model verifier, SPIN,
• assistance in the creation of the AWL parser, and
• creation of a symbol table visitor for AWSOME ASTs that reduces ambiguity in
specification component identification and forms the basis for further checking
of AWSOME ASTs.

1.6

Document Outline
The organization of this document is as follows:

Chapter Two introduces theory and practices relating to formal specification and
object-oriented analysis, Chapter Three proposes a methodology and constraints by

which an analysis model may be verified, Chapter Four details the implementation
of the proposed methodology, and Chapter Five evaluates the methodology and
implementation, and proposes opportunities for further research.

77. Background
This chapter introduces some fundamental concepts required in order to understand
the motivation for, and how to formally specify, object-oriented systems and their
subsequent validation and verification (V&V). The first section of this chapter provides an introduction to formal specifications and V&V prior to a discussion of
common practices in industrial V&V today.
The second part of this chapter provides background required for an understanding of this research in particular and introduces the Z specification language,
Promela modeling language, AFIT's wide spectrum language AWL, Rumbaugh's
Object Modeling Technique (OMT) and representation of the OMT models using Z,
Promela and AWL.
2.1

Formal Specifications
The purpose of a specification is to define all the characteristics that a system is

to embody. Specifications should be defined in such a manner as to make each statement provable. A statement is deemed provable if its fulfillment by the generated
product may be proven via formal logic or mathematical argument [Berztiss].
The more comprehensive and thorough that V&V testing is needed to be, the
more detailed and precise the specifications are required to be. As such, without
formally specifying a system, it is not possible to ensure that ambiguities do not
exist, that the requirements are complete and free of errors, or that the test cases
created are valuable.
Often a mixture of formal and semi-formal methods is used in the analysis and
design of software systems with the amount of effort devoted to specification and
verification being dependent upon the criticality of the particular software component. This practice highlights the tradeoff between component criticality and the
cost of formal specification and verification.

Potter describes formal specifications of software engineering systems as including: (i) some specification of the input-output behaviour of the system (the
relationship between preconditions and postconditions), and (ii) a description of
how this behaviour can be effected [Potter]. This perspective is likened by Ghezzi to
a "black box" and "glass box view" of the system respectively [Ghezzi]. The black
box view of the system deals solely with the external requirements of the system's
input/output behaviour whilst the glass box view dictates the internal machinations
of the system.
The predominant areas of mathematics that create the formal foundation to
00A are logic, type theory, category theory, and process algebra [Goldsack]. The
virtues of formal specifications come at a price. Increased specification complexity
leads to increased difficulty and time required to create the specification. It is this
balance that sees formal methods typically applied only to components of critical
importance or the application of semi-formal methods that are not as robust or
extensive [Gulch].

2.2

Validation and Verification
Validation and verification are the terms given to describe the process by which

a product is evaluated to ensure that it meets the user's requirements (validation)
and the specifications that it was based upon (verification). Verification is often
thought of as "building the system right" [O'Keefe] and validation as "building the
right system" [Meseguer]. The later that testing occurs in the software process,
the greater the risk that errors will result in dramatic increases in cost and time
to correct. Progressive V&V throughout the design process ensures that errors are
detected as quickly as is practical, hence reducing the risk they offer to project
budget and deadline [Brooks].
Formal specifications lend themselves well to V&V techniques. The precise and
explicit nature of formal method descriptions may be used to generate comprehensive

specifications. The characteristics that formal methods embody are not, however, all
beneficial. Formal specifications are quite often cumbersome, time consuming and
complex to create [Gulch].
V&V implementations should provide the software engineer with sufficient confidence in a system's correctness, completeness, robustness, precision, safety, and
other quality attributes. Presently we find that many of these concerns in 00 analysis and design are addressed only partially or by indirect evidence only [Goldsack].
In order to rectify this situation, V&V methods require precise information about
the task the system is required to perform [Pressman]. Formal specifications can
provide a pivotal advantage in satisfying this need.

2.3

Current Practices in Verification
The most prevalent techniques for V&V in use today can be categorized into

one of the following four groups:
1. Inspection,
2. Static Verification,
3. Empirical Testing, and
4. Empirical Evaluation.
Inspection techniques are employed to identify semantic errors and are typically
performed by someone who is knowledgeable with respect to the problem domain—
such as a domain engineer. A common problem with inspection techniques is that
they are usually carried out by the person(s) responsible for the generation of the
domain specification in the first place and they may therefore fail to detect errors.
This failure to detect errors can usually be attributed to the fact that the possibility
of a specific error has remained unconsidered, or that the domain engineers see what
they think the specification says rather than what is actually being specified. Hence,
it is wise for an independent expert, that is, one who is not involved directly in
9

the code generation, to inspect the system. It must be noted that as the problem
becomes more complex, the difficulty that a human expert experiences increases
[Pressman].
Static verification searches the domain for anomalies [Meseguer 1992].

An

anomaly in the domain relates to an axiom that suggests the possibility of an error
within the specification. It is usual for an anomaly to be a contradiction of a general
property of the domain such as an inconsistency. Static verification is quite often
carried out by automated tools due to the complexity of the errors being checked
for. The tools available for static verification vary in the comprehensiveness of their
search for anomalies [Verdaguer]. Static verification tools are very much dependent
upon the semantics of the specification language used and are therefore infrequently
reused in other applications not specified with the same representation.
Opportunities for the application of static verification are frequent within AWSOME analysis models—each class has an invariant proposition that cannot be contradicted by any other proposition of the class. For example, the postcondition of
a class method cannot result in a class attribute value being inconsistent with the
class invariant, nor may a state invariant be inconsistent with respect to the class
invariant.
Empirical testing attempts to check the system via the execution of test sets
of data. That is, by injecting known preconditions (the test data) into the system,
one is able to predict the correct postconditions and compare these with the actual
results witnessed. In order for the testing to be comprehensive, every input that
could potentially occur must be tested. This requirement results in an exhaustive
set of input conditions to execute—an undertaking of immense proportions for almost
any real world system. The lack in practicality of such a test set leads to creation
of a finite test set that must carefully be determined—the most common methods
of forming such tests sets are with functional and structural testing in mind.

10

Structural testing has been developed to test as many of the components of a
system as possible—examples include the instantiation of as many objects as possible, or the proof of as many axioms as possible. Functional testing takes a more
validatory approach by checking specified pre- and postcondition relations with what
is observed at execution. The problem of deciding upon what constitutes a comprehensive test case is not the only one to be encountered; in some systems the "correct"
behaviour is ill-defined and must be defined prior to test case formulation.
Empirical evaluation is testing that occurs in order to ensure that the system meets the user's requirements regarding specified qualities such as performance,
maintainability, documentation, and acceptance. Such acceptance testing is conducted upon an operational system by the users and/or the designers and occurs
either on site or under controlled conditions.
The least likely candidate techniques for adoption in this research are inspection testing and empirical evaluation testing. Inspection testing has a high dependence upon the specific domain and application. It is true, however, that although
the actual implementation makes for a poor candidate, the underlying methodologies
are to a great degree independent of the specification language and as such, are totally relevant to this thesis. Empirical evaluation, however, requires an implemented
system to be performed upon, and as such is not as relevant to this thesis, which
focuses upon verification of formal specifications.
It is important to note that simply because a proposition (axiom) is logically
correct that the specification is still not guaranteed to specify the intended system.
It is true that there exists a necessity for all axioms within a specification to be
logically correct but this alone is not enough to ensure that the system is in fact
verified.
The majority of verification tools can only be applied to systems that have been
implemented in direct comparison to systems that have only been formally specified.

11

Tools that require an implemented system in order to function leave the verification
until far too late in the process model, thus leading to increased rectification costs.
2.3.1

Definition and Goals of V&V for this Research.
2.3.1.1

Correctness.

Today, much controversy still abounds within

the verification community as to what the definition of "correctness" is with respect
to formally specified systems and the credibility of such proofs [Berg]. It is difficult
to define specification correctness without a specification to provide a context. For
the purposes of this research, correctness is defined as preservation of the analysis
model's semantics, and that the analysis model is internally consistent and complete.
A useful definition for the correctness of an implementation of a specification
is that the implementation be consistent with the specification.
2.3.1.2

Consistent.

For the purposes of this research, in order to

maintain internal consistency, it must be ensured that contradictory conditions are
not capable of being true at the same time. That is, there should be no opportunity
for contradictions to exist simultaneously. Consistency also requires postconditions
of the analysis model and the specification to be equivalent for a given precondition.
It is worth noting that the internal consistency of an analysis model is not related
to the specification's consistency with user needs. It is outside the scope of this
research to validate informal user needs.
For the purposes of this research, in order to maintain consistency, it must be
ensured that conditions of the domain are not contradictory. That is, at no time
may two conflicting expressions be satisfiable.
2.3.1.3

Complete.

Completeness requires that the analysis model be

free from ambiguity and conform to certain semantic properties specified in Chapter
Three.

12

2.3.14

Satisfaction of Correctness Requirements.

Note that these

three objectives also form a subset of those proposed by Collofello : correctness,
consistency, necessity, performance, and sufficiency (completeness) [Collofello]. Performance and necessity are both outside the scope of this research.
As a result of the above definitions, for an 00 analysis model to satisfy the
requirements for correctness, one must show the following:
1. That the constituent structural, dynamic and functional models are consistent
and complete—that the specification is provably correct.
2. Execution of the specification (if the specification is executable) is correct if it
is conformant (i.e. same output for a given input) with the expected output.
This requirement is applicable solely to the dynamic model and is tantamount
to an exhaustive state space search by a dynamic model checker coupled with
selected use case test sets.
Not all specifications require formal semantics. Nor does a specification need to
be entirely formal in order for verification to be applicable. Semi-formal specifications
still have associated semantics that may be used as a basis for verification. Quite
often, the complexity of the specification and verification of a system component are
directly proportional to its perceived criticality. By the same token, the strength of
the verification capable of being carried out is proportional to the formality of the
specification.
2.3.2

Validation Testing.

During post integration testing, the software sys-

tem is verified to ensure that integration errors are detected and resolved so that a
truly integrated system exists. At this point the final phases of testing may proceed.
These final phases of testing culminate in the validation of the users' requirements.
Pressman defines validation as ensuring the system functions as "reasonably" expected by the customer [Pressman].
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This reasonable set of acceptance criteria should be stipulated within the original specification for the system and the validation testing conducted should be based
upon the aforementioned criteria. Validation and verification should not necessarily
be viewed as two entirely separate entities as the pair are rather interdependent.
Some believe that the various levels of verification testing that occur throughout
development, together with other testing methods are the only tools a validator
requires to obtain maximum evidence as to correctness of the system [Meseguer].
Software validation endeavors to show through a series of tests that the system
conforms with the users' needs.

The tests conducted are typically black box in

nature, that is, they are unconcerned with how the solution is attained, just that it
meets the requirements specified [Pressman]. Soon after the specification generation
occurs in the software process lifecycle, the types of tests to be conducted and the
manner in which they are to be executed should be planned. Specific test cases should
be defined that provide for thorough investigation of conformity with requirements.
The aim of the test plan produced is to ensure all functional and quality requirements
are satisfied.
Two possible results stem from each validation test conducted—either the test
results are as expected from the specification, or a discrepancy is determined between
the system's behaviour and that specified. Both the user and developers should
address the importance of the deficiency and what needs to be done to rectify the
situation.
One method by which to ensure our analysis model is conformant with requirements and that it is free from faults, is to execute either the specification or
the product of the transformation (in this case an analysis model) [Collofello]. The
theorem prover and dynamic model checker used in this thesis are both capable of
simulating attribute values and thus meet Collofello's requirements for execution.
One should remain mindful of the fact that in order to mathematically ensure
the validation of a system's qualities, those qualities must be formalized. It may be
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argued that it is the qualities (not just the functionality) of the system that drives its
software architecture and that these quality attributes are satisfied via the selection
of an adequate software architecture [Williams,Shock]. Assuming the architecture
selection/transformation is verifiable, the quality attributes required for validation
testing are thus outside the scope of this research.
Other methods of testing that complement verification and lead to system
validation but are outside the scope of this research include [Meseguer]:
1. Functional testing—development of black-box input test cases to be compared
to expected behavior,
2. Structural testing—path coverage—applicable in module, integration, and regression phases of testing,
3. Error oriented analysis—statistical analysis of erroneous system behaviour focused upon explaining error occurrence,
4. Hybrid testing—an amalgam of other testing techniques suited to the specific
problem at hand,
5. Integration testing—type range, top down, bottom up, big bang and threaded,
6. Transaction flow analysis—a structured software design technique that analyzes a system based upon the transactions the system must process,
7. Failure analysis—determination of the exact nature and location of an error
in order to correct the error, identify and rectify similar errors, and to initiate
action to prevent occurrences of this type of error in the future,
8. Concurrency analysis—testing aimed at evaluating the performance of concurrent systems, and
9. Performance Analysis—dependent upon those qualities that are specified and
provided with metrics to assess compliance.
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2.3.3 Early Approaches to Verification.

Early verification methods in-

cluded:
1. Hoare Logic—a simple language consisting of assignment, statement sequences,
whiles and if-then-elses. Each of these rules is interpreted by a proof rule. The
assignment rule is an axiom, the other three are inference rules.
2. Dijkstra's Approach—he extended Hoare's logic by stressing the importance of
the postcondition and expressed predicates in terms of the set{P}S{R} where
R is the result of applying S to the precondition P. "Note that the [weakest
precondition] WP method ensures total correctness. The significant difference
between the two approaches is in the way they deal with looping, because the
weakest-precondition approach has to ensure loops terminate" [Berztiss].
3. Mill's Functional Correctness—depends upon functions and relations, in contrast with the pre- and post-condition focus of the former methods.
Such approaches remain commonly accepted as being valuable [Meseguer]. Two
avenues of verification exist for an algebraic specification—to verify the programs
against the specification as it stands using Guttag's method [Guttag], or to transform
the specification into a form that can be used with the inductive assertion method
[Floyd].
2.4

Transformation Systems
The impetus for transformation systems is the maintenance of system speci-

fications instead of source code. That is, the use of verified correctness-preserving
transforms to generate source code from formal specifications results in the software
engineer directing the majority of his efforts toward analysis, design and validation
without the requirement for code generation as this facet of the software process
becomes automatic, or at least semi-automated as depicted in Figure 1 [Balzer].
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Automated Transformation Paradigm.

It is envisaged that the input elements to a transformation system originate
from a repository of domain knowledge that is harvested for pertinent specifications
as well as the generation of problem specific analysis that can be added to the
repository for later reuse.

2.5

AWSOME
Until recently, proofs of concept relating to transformation system research at

AFIT were demonstrated via the proof of concept tool—AFITtool. AFITtool consisted of a domain AST, specification AST and design AST as illustrated in
Figure 2 [Hartrum]. The intent of the domain AST was to encapsulate domain
knowledge relevant to a specific domain. The problem specification (analysis) AST
was generated from the parsing of Z Schemas (using Z-MkXsyntax) extended with
state transition data [Hartrum, Bailor] that formalized the problem into the specification AST along with any harvested domain knowledge from the domain AST
[Anderson]. Transformation of the specification AST resulted in the design AST
that could then be transformed into executable code [Kissack, Tankersley].
The Z representation of OMT used as input to AFITtool differs only slightly
from that introduced in the implementation of this research described in Chapter
Four. Differences occur in the representation of structural model associations and
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dynamic model transitions. Although kept to a minimum, extensions to Z were
required to model the entire OMT analysis model as Z's ability to represent the
dynamic model is insufficient [Hartrum,Bailor].
AFITtool was implemented in the high level language REFINE [Reasoning].
Noe integrated a commercial GUI object editor, Rational Rose, to the front end
of AFITtool that somewhat simplified the formalization effort required to specify a
system [Noe]. Rational Rose provides only a semi-formal ability to specify an objectoriented system and thus required augmentation via the addition of the ability to
integrate axioms. These axioms conform with Z syntax to allow for straight forward
parsing into the analysis AST.
The year 2000 has seen the rebirth of AFITtool as the AFIT Wide-Spectrum
Object Modeling Environment (AWSOME). Essentially AWSOME is a redesign of
AFITtool, a second generation prototype of a transformation system. The AWSOME
tool consists of an analysis AST that contains a representation of the problem being
modeled; this model may be semi-automatically transformed via verified transformations into a design model that addresses some details of the problem to a greater
level of depth. This design AST forms the foundation of the code to be generated
via the use of another set of verified transformations (see Figure 3 [Cornn]). Conceptually, this code may then be validated and any incongruities may be addressed
at the specification level.
AWSOME makes use of a language developed within AFIT's KBSE group
called the AFIT Wide-spectrum Language (AWL). This language evolved from the
work done by Graham that resulted in the wide-spectrum language COIL [Graham].
AWSOME is based upon formal language theory, and as such is capable of the formal
specification of object-oriented systems. AWL has been designed as a strict language
hence it performs some of the verification effort and reduces specification ambiguity.
Being a wide-spectrum language, AWL is capable of representation of systems
at the specification, analysis, design and implementation levels. The lower levels of
18
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AWL are not dealt with in this research as they are outside the scope of system analysis. AWL is capable of modeling both structural and object-oriented programming
styles and has intentionally been kept independent of any other particular software
language.
An example of the difference between AWSOME analysis and design ASTs
is: at the analysis level, AWSOME represents class methods in terms of pre- and
postconditions, therefore free of design decisions relating to any choice of algorithm
while at the design level, these pre- and postcondition expressions are transformed
into statements that form the body of the method.
The fact that any form of input specification, other than an AWL specification,
must be transformed into an analysis AST means that a specification must conform
to AWL semantic requirements. That is to say, there are certain productions by
which an analysis AST is created using the AWSOME language and these production
rules must be enforced by any other input media. This shall be elaborated upon in
Chapter Three but suffice it to say here that it meets Berg's requirements for a
specification language in that it:

1. is intuitively understandable to specifiers and validators and uses syntax that
adheres closely to elements of the OMT,
2. has rigorous mathematical semantics, defined in set theory and propositional
calculus,
3. is compatible with the structuring theory and formal methods to be used in
this research,
4. engenders wide spectrum applicability and comprehensive expressive power.
2.5.1

Research Conducted by AFIT's KBSE.

and implemented in AWSOME has included:
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Research conducted at AFIT

1. Tool integration, that is, the ability to integrate a number of object oriented domain models based upon their structural attributes into the one AST [Ashby],
2. Generation of relational Schemas in the form of Data Description Language
(DDL) from an AWSOME specification—affording the capability of persistent
relational storage of object-oriented domain models and the transformation of
class associations and postconditions to Data Manipulation Language [Buckwaiter],
3. Information management in the form of a repository founded in object oriented
database technology, giving AWSOME the capability to integrate numerous
stand alone software synthesis tools into an integrated environment [Cornn],
4. Generation of executable code via the transformation of dynamic models into
structural and functional components and its applicability to agent based systems [Marsh],
5. Semi-automated transformation of relational Schemas to AWSOME ASTs [Pearson],
6. The proposition of a taxonomy of software architectures and a methodology
for representing software architectures and styles in AWSOME [Williams], and
7. the work conducted as part of this thesis.
2.6 Rumbaugh's Object Modeling Technique
Rumbaugh's Object Modeling Technique (OMT) is the paradigm used to model
domains in AWSOME. Using classes as the key foundation, OMT describes their
attributes and characteristics via structural, functional, and dynamic models. For a
description of AWL and how it represents OMT, refer to Appendix A.
2.6.1

Structural Model.

The structural, or object, model represents the

static structure of a system via the constituent objects of the system, the associations
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between those objects and the methods and attributes of each. Of the three models,
Rumbaugh considers the structural to be the most important—this is due to the
fact that in 00A, object identification is more important than early analysis of
functionality [Rumbaugh]. It helps if object classes form intuitive components of the
system being modeled, thus object selection is domain dependent. An object class
consists of the attributes (data values) and methods (functions and transformations)
inherent to the class.
Figure 4 represents the structural model of a cruise missile system while Figure
5 provides sample AWSOME code describing a portion of this model. The cruise
missile is an aggregate class consisting of a propulsion system, airframe, warhead,
and avionics software. The airframe, propulsion system and avionics software classes
are themselves aggregates. The three vectors position, velocity and acceleration are
examples of subclasses as they inherit the characteristics of the superclass vector.
The cruise missile model is presented in its entirety in Appendix B.
Aggregation is a specific category of association. An aggregate class is one that
is comprised of other classes and the aggregation association relates objects of the
specific classes.
Inheritance allows one to model the similarities of certain classes whilst maintaining their differences. Take for example, the inheritance relationship between
acceleration and vector. Vector is a class with three attributes of type real, namely
x, y, and z. Acceleration is a type of vector and inherits the attributes and operations defined for vector but also extends upon those operations by inclusion of other
operations specific to the acceleration class.
Conjecture abounds with respect to the semantics of inheritance [Rumbaugh,
Booch, Booch et. al., Wegner, TaivalSaari, Alexander]. Zdonick proposes four different categories of inheritance [Zdonick]:
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Cruise Missile Structural Model.

1. cancellation—allows for redefinition of class methods or even removal of methods from the subclass,
2. name compatibility—the subclass must preserve the set of names inherited
from the superclass but is free to redefine them,
3. signature compatibility—the subclass must embody the syntactic interface of
the superclass, and
4. behavior compatibility—the subclass may not modify the characteristics of the
superclass. This form of inheritance is termed strict inheritance and ensures
that the child class is substitutable for the parent class.
Strict inheritance is the sole form of inheritance referred to within this research.
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package cruiseMissile is
class fuelTank is
private fuelLevel : bigReal;
private outputFlowRate : bigReal;
end class;
class missileFuelTank is fuelTank with
private fixedWeight : realWeight;
invariant fixedWeight = tankWeight + (fuelDensity * capacity / 2)
and inputFlowRate = 0
end class;
class navigationSystem is
private navState : navStates;
end class;
class flightProfile is
private timeOnTarget : time;
private flightPath : route;
end class;
class warhead is
private weight : mass;
private munitionType : string;
private explosiveForce : yield;
private armed : boolean;
invariant weight > 0.0 and explosiveForce >= 0.0
end class;
class airframe is
private pos : position;
private accl : acceleration;
private vel : velocity;
private afState : afStates;
private heading : real;
private elevation : real;
invariant heading <= 2*pi and heading >= 0.0 and elevation <= pi/2
and elevation >= -pi/2
end class;

Figure 5.

Partial AWSOME Language Representation of Cruise Missile Structural

Model
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class propulsionSystem is
private fuelFeed : throttle;
private engine : jetEngine;
private tank : missileFuelTank;
invariant (tank.fuelLevel = 0.0 => fuelFeed.maximumFlowRate =0.0)
and (tank.fuelLevel > 0.0 =>(fuelFeed.maximumFlowRate =
engine.maximumFuelFlowRate)) and (engine.currentFuelFlowRate =
fuelFeed.actualFlowRate)
end class;
class cruiseMissile is
private propulsion : propulsionSystem;
private frame : airframe;
private payload : warhead;
private avionics : avionicsSoftware;
private cmState : cmStates;
end class;
end package;
Figure 5.

2.6.2

Partial AWSOME Language Representation of Cruise Missile Structural
Model cont.
Dynamic Model.

The dynamic model represents the temporal rela-

tionships between functional components of the domain model. The dynamic model
illustrates what will happen when certain conditions (guards and received events)
hold irrespective of how it will happen. The dynamic model also describes the behaviour states by which a class is defined. Figure 6 illustrates the Mealy model
representation of the class Airframe while Figure 7 gives the corresponding AWL
syntax.
A state may contain an invariant condition but all actions and events occur
upon transitions. Transition syntax in AWL is:
<IN> currentState <0N> receiveEvent [<IF> guard] [<D0>action]
[<send> (sendEvent)*]} to nextState
With reference to Figure 6, if the airframe is in the state "powered flight"
and it receives the event "change course" and the guard condition "true" is satis26

fied, then the airframe will transition to the state "maneuvering" until it receives a
"doManeverComplete" event.

initAirframe [ true ] / iru'tializeAirrrameO

preLanuch

inertialFlight

tankEmpty [true ]

doManeuverComplete [ true ]

poweredFlight

changeCourse [ true ]

estimatePosition[ true ] / setPosinonO

Figure 6.

2.6.3 Functional Model.

Airframe Dynamic Model.

The computations or transformations of data

that occur within classes are represented by OMT's functional model in the form of
data flow diagrams. The functional model is hierarchical in structure; that is, each
process may be further refined by intermediate levels of detail. At the lowest level
of abstraction, the processes of the functional model are termed leaf operations.
The functional model does not describe how transformations occur or when they
take place, it simply identifies the inputs and outputs of those processes. Figure
8 represents the calculateAcceleration leaf operation of the airframe functional
model while Figure 9 gives the AWSOME syntax for the missileFuelTank method
changeFlow.
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dynamic model is
event initAirframe () ;
event doLaunchO;
event tankEmptyO;
event estimatePositionO ;
event changeCourseO;
event maneuverCompleteO;
event outOfFuelO;
state
state
state
state
state

start invariant afState= startairframe;
preLaunch invariant afState = preLaunchairframe;
poweredFlight invariant afState = poweredFlightairframe;
maneuvering invariant afState = maneuveringairframe;
inertialFlight invariant afState = inertialFlightairframe;

transition table is
in initial on initAirframe if true to airframelnit;
in airf ramelnit on AUTOMATIC if true send initDoneO;
to poweredFlight;
in poweredFlight on tankEmpty if true to inertialFlight;
in poweredFlight on getPosition if true send positionCurrentO;
to poweredFlight;
in poweredFlight on changeCourse if true to maneuvering;
in maneuvering on doManeuverComplete if true to poweredFlight;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
Figure 7.
2.7

Airframe Dynamic Model in AWSOME syntax

Z
Traditionally, the formal specifications entered into AFITtool took the shape

of Z Schemas [Hartrum, Bailor]. In 1997, Noe created a set of automated transforms
that generated Z specifications from augmented UML diagrams created with the
CASE tool Rational Rose. The formal language Z is founded in mathematics such
as prepositional calculus and set theory. The language is far more extensive than
the subset that is capable of being parsed into the AFITtool domain model.
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Airframe Functional Model.

private procedure changeFlow(actualFlowRate : in bigReal)
guarantees outputFlowRate' = actualFlowRate? and
fuelLevel' = fuelLevel and capacity' = capacity and
tankWeight' = tankWeight and fuelDensity' = fuelDensity
Figure 9.

Missile Fuel Tank Method—changeFlowQ
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propulsionSystem
fuelFeed: throttle
engine: jetEngine
tank: missileFuelTank

Figure 10.

PropulsionSystem Object Model.

.propulsionSystem
fuelFeed: throttle
engine : jetEngine
tank : missileFuelTank
tank, fuel Lev el = 0.0 =>• fuelFeed.maximumFlowRate = 0.0
tank.fuelLevel 0.0 => fuelFeed.maximumFlowRate =
engine.maximumFuelFlowRate
engine.cur rent Fuel Flow Rate = fuelFeed.actualFlowRate

Figure 11.

PropulsionSystem Schema.

The building block of Z is the schema. This is comprised of a signature and
predicate. The signature essentially introduces the attributes or variables of the
schema whilst the predicate stipulates the axioms that define those attributes.
Schemas may be used to represent classes, operations, events, and states. Type
definitions are detailed via axiomatic definitions, operations by dynamic schemas,
and structural components via static schemas. An example structural model for the
class cruise missile is located at Figure 10. Note the inability of the OMT model to
convey invariant constraints that are represented in the same class when expressed
as a Z schema—Figure 11. This is an example of how a semi-formal specification
system must be augmented with prose in order to provide the requisite formalization.
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Z has been used in a number of object-oriented analysis models but it is noted
that Z is not ideal as an 00 specification language due to its semantic complexity.
In order to achieve a sufficient level of formalism, Z++, ZSPECK, Schuman+Pitt,
OOZE, MooZ, and Object-Z have extended Z substantially [Goldsack, Stepney].
None of these versions of Z were adopted for this research due to the fact that by
their very nature, their use is not supported by existing Z-based theorem provers
and does not conform with Spivey or ISO standard Z[Stepney].
It is the author's opinion that it is better to use multiple analysis representations and verifications tools that are best suited to certain portions of the analysis
model than to use an unsupported tool that extends a specification language. If
proper integration can be achieved then the user is none the wiser.

2.8

00A and Verification
During the course of this research, it was discovered that literature dealing

with the formal specification of 00 systems and their validation and verification (as
opposed to either their V&V or formal specification) is rather rare and difficult to
come by. By far the majority of 00 specification literature is not formally developed
to the extent that stringent verification methods could be used against analysis
models specified in accordance with such methods.
Extrapolating from Bertziss' research dealing with the verification of abstract
data types [Bertziss], it can be proposed that three tasks must be performed in order
to verify the correctness of a class:
1. Determination of whether an implementation is going to have certain properties
prior to implementation. This comes from knowledge of the method by which
the specification is generated and the transformation process.

This task is

predominantly conducted via inspection by experts but the structure of an
analysis AST described by AWSOME's metamodel ensures certain semantic
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constraints conforming to this rule such as what may form components of the
structural, functional and dynamic models,
2. Demonstration of completeness and consistency of the specification,
3. Implementation should be provably consistent with its specification—or more
readily for the AWSOME transformation system—transforms should provably
maintain the correctness of the modeled system.

2.9

Software Process Model
Many software engineering process models exist, and until recently, many of

those have had little or no avenue for redressing faults until code has been generated
as it is the code that is tested to ensure compliance with the specification. Therefore,
many of these models attempt to output code quickly and incrementally.
As already pointed out the cost and time required to rectify an error during
code maintenance is far greater than modification of a specification. The process
model proposed below is a modification of that described by Berg [Berg] such that
it facilitates an iterative design, thus allowing for faster detection and rectification
of errors and does not make the tenuous assumption that an entire system can
successfully be formally specified within a single iteration. It is worth noting that a
transformation system such as AWSOME readily facilitates iterative processes due
to the fact that as soon as the specification is modified, the product that is to be
verified and validated is instantly available.
The modified software process model is as follows:
1. Establishment of user requirements,
2. User requirements are specified in accordance with a formal language resulting
in a formal specification that is provably correct as discussed in Chapters Three
and Four,
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3. The specification is then validated to show that it satisfies the goals of development. This is typically performed by inspection but may also be augmented
by automation (specification interpreters). Tools such as these permit input
values to be injected into functions in a specification and then return the associated output values that the specification defines, thus allowing for validation
via inspection. Note that validation can also include quality attributes that
are difficult to formalize and as such are outside the scope of this research.
4. After satisfying the requirements for the properties of being well formed and
validated, the specification is used to guide the implementation of the system. In AWSOME, this correlates to driving the requisite transformations to
generate code.
5. Berg states that the code is then verified by proofs of correctness that ensure
adherence to the validated formal specification. These proofs are typically
heavily automated but our previous step that implemented verified transforms
makes this a redundant phase of the software development process.
6. Berg then suggests a final testing phase to double-check the proofs. The test
strategies are developed to (work well from) the specifications.
7. If any deficiencies are highlighted by validation then repeat the process.

2.10 Relation Between Background and This Research
Many of the concepts introduced in this chapter are used in the methodology
proposed as part of this research. Essentially, the methodology put forward is best
described as a hybrid—the dynamic, structural and functional models of OMT are
better suited to different forms of verification testing than a single technique.
All three OMT models embody characteristics that are suited to static verificätionthese form the backbone of tests that ensure consistency of the analysis model, such
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as invariant constraint consistency, and functional pre- and postcondition analysis
similar to the work done by Dijkstra.
The dynamic model is well suited to both forms of empirical testing.

An

exhaustive search of the state space corresponds to structural empirical testing and
is relevant to state reachability analysis. The injection of a use case test set into
a dynamic model corresponds to empirical functional testing and may be used to
validate the dynamic behavior modeled by the specification.
The completeness of an analysis model relies heavily upon the semantics of
AWL. The productions rules, type checking and name analysis that occur as part of
parsing specifications into an AWSOME analysis AST enforce a great deal of structure that will result in notification of an error to the software engineer if neglected.
For example, if a user attempted to define a dynamic model transition without a
current state or a next state, the parser would not accept the declaration as it is not
complete with respect to the production rule for an AWSOME transition—refer to
Appendix A for a list of AWSOME productions.
The next chapter details proposed constraints upon the analysis model that
must be enforced as part of the V&V of an object oriented formal specification
generated in AWSOME.
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III. Methodology
3.1

Introduction
The research conducted focuses upon the aspects of a formal specification that

can be checked within the analysis AST itself. Any verification that occurs internal
to the analysis AST is independent of the method by which the problem is formally
specified. Therefore, if a new method of specification is implemented, the verification
methods proposed in this research will continue to be applicable. To put it another
way, no matter the specification method—be it Z Schemas, a GUI object editor or the
AWL—these methods will remain applicable without modification as they function
upon the analysis AST itself.
The verification issues addressed by this research apply predominantly to specification consistency, correctness, and completeness as defined in Chapter Two. The
problem of verifying correctness, consistency, and completeness has been approached
from six different but interrelated avenues. These perspectives spawn from a combination of the granularity of the analysis performed, that is whether the analysis
is at the inter or intra-class level, and the focus of the analysis—whether it be the
structural, dynamic or functional model of the system. Figure 12 illustrates this
breakup as a table, it can be seen that one axis corresponds to the three OMT class
models [structural, functional, dynamic] and the other corresponds to the level of
abstraction [class, domain]. These delineations were made so as to break the problem
into a more manageable size.
By automating some or all of the verification process, the amount of effort
required by the specifier for V&V is reduced. This reduction in the effort required
to formally verify a system increases the value of formal specifications with respect
to other methods of V&V such as inspection. It must be noted, however, that in
many cases other than the rules proposed subsequently in this chapter, a test plan is
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Figure 12.

Analysis Model Perspectives.

required that has certain proof goals that provide direction to the verification effort.
Verification without a clear plan and direction is far from an optimal solution.
It is the aim of this chapter to identify and explicitly define well-formed constraints to which an object-oriented analysis model must conform. These constraints
are introduced according to the six categories detailed above and are first given a
textual description and then a formal definition in propositional calculus. These
constraints are described without regard for their testability at this stage of the
document as it is the constraints themselves that direct object-oriented analysis and
thus form the focus of this research and not their automated testability.

3.2

Definition of the 00 Analysis Domain Model
To assist in formalization of the analysis model constraints, definition of the

domain and its components must be made. Below is a conceptual model of the
domain for which AWL provides a concrete surface syntax.
A domain consists of the tuple: Classes, Types, Assocs, AssocObjs, Consts
where Classes is the set of classes present in the domain, Types is the set of data
types of the domain, Assocs is the set of associations within the domain, AssocObjs
is the set of associative objects, and Consts is the set of global constants.
For the purposes of this document, a type is defined as type = name, inv
where inv is the type invariant. This is an extremely simplistic representation of the
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capabilities of the AWSOME language to model types, but is sufficient for the rules
to be defined.
A class is defined as the tuple: name, inv, Attrs, Ops, Trans, States, Events
where name is the class identifier, inv is the class invariant expression, Attrs is a set
of attributes, Ops is a set of operations defining the functional model, Trans is a set
of transitions describing the dynamic behavior of the class, and States is a set of
states that define the class behavior.
An expression is a well-formed boolean or arithmetic expression capable of
being proved correct.
Class attributes consist of a name and a type, i.e., attribute = name, type,
value where name is the attribute identifier and type is the data type of the attribute.
Constants and parameters are also represented by the tuple name, type, value. Note
that AWSOME provides greater depth to the modeling of attributes and parameters
such as whether a class attribute is public or private and whether the mode of a
parameter is in, out or in and out.
Data objects are also defined by the tuple name, type, value. The function
dataSet(expression) returns the set of data objects referred to in an expression. For
the sake of dataSet(), there is no difference between a variable's ticked and unticked
references. It is worth noting that data object is a generalization of both attribute
and class, and as such both inherit the tuple name, type.
Operations are defined by the tuple name, pre, post, Params where pre and
post are the pre- and postcondition expressions of an operation respectively, Params
is the sequence of parameters of the operation. Operation calls are invocations of
operations and consist of a reference to the operation to be invoked and a sequence of
arguments that represent the input parameters of the operation, i.e., operationCall
= name, Args. For the purposes of this research, at the analysis level, all operations
are representative of procedures as opposed to functions.
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Transitions are defined by the tuple transition current, receive, guard, action,
Sends, next. Current and next refer to the current and next states of the transition
respectively. The guard condition of a transition is an expression, the action is a call
to a class method, receive is the event that triggers the transition, and Sends is the
set of events sent as a product of the transition. States are comprised of an identifier
and an invariant expression, i.e., state = name, invariant. Events consist of a name,
a set of arguments (data objects), and an invariant expression, i.e., event = name,
Args, inv.
An association!?, represented by the tuple: association = endi, end2 where end\
and end2 refer to the identifiers of the two classes that constitute the association.
Although AWSOME is capable of representing associations of a higher order than
binary, this research is limited to binary associations due to the greatly increased
complexity associated with verifying ternary and higher associations. Associations
modeled in AWSOME are more complex than presented here—each end of an association has a role name and a cardinality but these are irrelevant to the constraints
proposed in this chapter.
Associative objects are comprised of an association, and operations and attributes particular to the associative object and are defined by the tuple:
assocObj = name, Attrs, Ops, assoc where name is the associative object identifier,
Attrs is the set of attributes, Ops the set of operations, and assoc is the binary
association.

3.3

Class-Level Constraints
The propositions of the following class-level constraints are assumed to relate

to an instance of a class this of a domain dorn, i.e., this € dom.Classes.
3.3.1

Structural Model.

Structurally speaking, classes consist of attributes

and their invariant predicates that dictate certain characteristics of their behavior.
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class airframe is
invariant heading <= (2*pi) and heading >= 0.0 and elevation <=
(pi/2) and elevation >= (-pi/2)
private pos : position;
private accl : acceleration;
private vel : velocity;
private afState : afStates;
private heading : real;
private elevation : real;
end class;
Figure 13.

Elements of the Cruise Missile Structural Model

It is these components that are of concern at the class level of verification as well as
ensuring the consistency of any subclasses with their respective superclasses.

Constraint 1 Attributes Must be Declared Over Defined Types
The definition of a data type declares the range of meaningful values of that type.
Hence it is important to know that each data object is an instance of a data type
in order to ensure that the context of any reference to the data object is consistent
with its range of values. It is therefore imperative to ensure that each data object is
in fact defined over an existing data type.
Va : attribute • a E this.Attrs =^> a.type 6 dom.Types U dom.Classes
As an example, Figure 13 contains the structural portion of the specification
for the class airframe. This class has the private attributes pos : position, accl :
acceleration, vel : velocity, afState : afStates, heading : real, and elevation : real.
The first three attributes refer to other classes, and as such, are aggregate
components of an airframe while the remaining attributes are all of types declared
within the domain. If any of the attribute types are undefined within the domain,
then the model fails to be complete.

Constraint 2 Any Variables Referenced Within an Object's Invariant Proposition
Must be Constants or Attributes of the Object
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In accordance with the object-oriented principle of data-abstraction, data modification or interrogation may only be performed by the class that is responsible for that
data's abstraction, or via methods provided by the class. Therefore, a class is only
able to reference its own variables and static values of the domain directly.
Vra : dataObject • (n <E dataSet(this.inv) ^ (n G dom.Consts) V (n e
this.Attrs)
The invariant of the class airframe, represented in Figure 5, refers to heading,
elevation, and pi. Heading and elevation are both of type real and attributes of the
class while pi is a real constant of the domain.
Constraint 3 Pre- and Postconditions Must be Consistent With the Class Invariant
Traditionally, AFITtool has used schema inclusion to imply method pre- and postcondition consistency with the class invariant. This research proposes explicitly
ensuring pre- and postconditions do not contradict the class invariant. While logically equivalent to the former method, the latter ensures that the constraint holds
rather than simply implying it holds.
Wop : operation • op £ this.Ops => (this.inv A op.pre A op.post) ^ false
Constraint 4 Invariant Propositions Must be Consistent With Respect to the Types
Over Which They Refer
Data types embody constraints upon the values that a variable of a given data
type may have. Consequently, any expression that refers to a class attribute or
global constant of such a data type must remain consistent with its constraint. That
is, values must remain within the attribute's range and operators must have some
associated semantic for the type(s) they are applied to.
This constraint may be separated into two lesser constraints:
1. the invariant of a class must not contradict its attribute type invariants, and
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2. invariants must be made np of type eompatible operators and operands (elaborated upon as Constraint 9).
The first constraint requires that the class invariant hold over all attributes of
the class and is expressed as:
Vn : iataOh3ect . a e Ms.AUrs A „
false

6

iotaSettthis.inv) A n.typeanv A tUs,„v /

For example, Fignre 14 contains specifications for the enumerated type flightD.rectorStates and the class flightDirector. The state invariants of flightDirector
d,ctate «he value of the variable flightDirectorState. This constraint states that
the state invariants must be consistent with respect to the attribute types to which
they refer, and as such, the invariant must not contradict the invariants of the aggregate components. Inspection suggests that there is no conflict between the type
and the state invariants as only those values enumerated in the type declaration are
ever referenced, that is, the state invariants „ever conflict with flightDirectorStates'
range of allowable values.
This constraint does, however, raise the complex issue of aggregate component
v.s.bfiity within the analysis model. Conceptually, the principles of data abstracts and .„formation hiding mean that classes only have direct access to their own
attnbutes-therefore a„ aggregate class does „ot have direct access to its subclass
attributes. It is worth noting that all class attribntes have been defined private in
the cr„ise missile example specificatio„ i„ order to strictly adhere with the objectonented software engineering concept of data hiding.

Constraint 5 Cass Invariants Should he Consistent unth Other Expressions of the
Class
Both the functional and dyn^ic models contain expressions that must be consistent
w.th the invariant specified for the class. Obviously, this rule is relevant to all
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perspectives of the domain analysis model and may seem somewhat repetitive when
mentioned elsewhere in the document in slightly different situations.
Let I be the set of expressions of the class—these expressions come from the
class state invariants, transition guard conditions and pre- and postconditions of
methods and actions.
Vt'i : expression • (h G this.I A this.inv ^ H) =4> {{i\ A this.inv) ^ false)
Appendix B contains the entire cruise missile model. The class missileFuelTank
has the invariant:
invariant fixedWeight = tankWeight + (fuelDensity * capacity / 2)
and inputFlowRate = 0
while the class method changeFuelFlowQ is defined by the postcondition:
guarantees outputFlowRate' = actualFlowRate and fuelLevel' = fuelLevel
and capacity' = capacity and tankWeight' = tankWeight
and fuelDensity' = fuelDensity
According to the constraint, the missileFuelTank invariant must be consistent
with respect to the postcondition of the class method changeFuelFlowQ which appears from inspection to hold true.
Constraint 6 Propositions of a Subclass Must be Consistent With Those of the
Superclass
Subclasses inherit the methods and attributes of their parent (super) classes. The
subclass cannot alter the characteristics of any of its inherited attributes—to do such
would mean that the superclass is not in fact a generalization of the subclass. Class
methods may be overridden but for the purpose of this research, they must retain
the logical equivalence of the inherited propositions.
Let superclass(cl5 c2) be a function that returns true if ca is the superclass of
c242

Vci : class Vc2 : class • (ci,c2 £ dom.Classes A superclass{c\, c2)) =£•
(c2if!D A ci.mu 7^ false)
As an example, take the class fuelTank and its subclass missileFuelTank in
Appendix B. FuelTank has the invariant fuelLevel > 0.0. Being a sub class of fuelTank and adhering to the constraint of strict inheritance, missileFuelTank therefore
inherits fuelTank's invariant as well as it own invariant of:
invariant fixedWeight = tankWeight + (fuelDensity * capacity / 2)
and inputFlowRate = 0
Constraint 7 Propositions of a Subclass Must be Substitutable For Those of the
Superclass
Strict inheritance requires that a subclass be substitutable for its parent class. Therefore, not only do the invariants need to be consistent, the subclass invariant must
also be weaker or equal to the parent class invariant, therefore the subclass invariant must not constrain that of the superclass. Chapter Six discusses the further
formalization of strict inheritance.
Vci : class Vc2 : class • (ci,c2 € dom.Classes A superclass(ci,c2)) =$■
(c2-inv =$> Ci.inv)
Returning to the example of Constraint 6, strict inheritance dictates that the
invariant of missileFuelTank must imply the superclass invariant which it most certainly does.
3.3.2

Functional Model.

The functional model represents the operations a

class embodies. This model describes the functionality of class operations irrespective
of temporal considerations. At the analysis level, these operations are described
via pre- and postconditions that define the output expected for a certain input
condition. Thus the output (postcondition) is defined as the result of a certain input
(precondition) and not as an explicit algorithm.
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Constraint 8 Operation Postconditions Must Maintain The Class Invariant
The postconditions of class operations must remain internally consistent with respect
to the class invariant.
Vop : operation • op 6 this.Ops => (op.post A this.inv) ^ false

Constraint 9 Mathematical Operators Are for Mathematical Types or Explicitly
Defined for the Type
Operators have certain associated semantics dependent upon the type to which they
apply.

For example, 2+3 is commonly accepted as equaling 5 in the domain of

integers but what does F-16 + F-16 equal? Two F-16s, one F-32?
In general, both operands of a binary operation must have the same type,
and the operator is said to have the type of the return value. AWSOME offers a
great deal of flexibility in type definitions and the operations they embody. This is
elaborated upon in Appendix A.
Let MO be the set of mathematical operators, MATH be the set of predefined mathematical types for Z {integer, natural}, DEFS be the set of user defined
types with mathematical operators—DEFS contains any mathematical subtype, set,
sequence, or bag declared in the domain.
The following syntax is defined : ex o e2 represents that application of binary
operator o to the operands ex and e2 while o(e) represents the application of a unary
operator to the operand e.
For binary operations, this constraint is defined as: Vei,e2 : expression Vo :
MO • ex o e2 =4> {{ei.type - e2.type A ei.type = o.type) A (ei.type € MATH U
DEF))
For unary operations, the constraint is: Ve : expression Vo : MO • o(e) =>
{{e.type = o.type) A {e.type € MATH U DEF))

44

Constraint 10 Pre- and Postconditions Must Refer Solely to Global Constants,
Class Attributes and Parameters
At the analysis level AWSOME represents class methods by set of formals (parameters), and pre- and postcondition expressions. Class methods must only refer to the
parameters passed to them (formals) and the attributes of the class. AWSOME has
the capability to model global variables as well as global constants but this research
does not address global variables at the analysis level.
Va : expression Wb : expression Vo : operation • o G this.Ops A a = o.pre A
b — o.post A (n G dataSet(a) ^(n£ dom.Consts)
V (n G this.Attrs)
V (n G o.Params)
V n G dataSet(b) =>■ (n G dom.Consts)
V (n E this.Attrs)
V (np G o.Params))

Constraint 11 Operation Parameters Must be Defined Over Existing Types
Every parameter referenced via an operation must belong to a data type defined for
the problem domain specified.
Vp : parameter Wo : operation • o € this.Ops ApG o.Params =$> p.dataType G
dorn.Types
3.3.3

Dynamic Model.

The dynamic model describes the behavior of a

class with respect to how events interact without concern for what functionality the
events actually engender. This functionality is described in the functional model.

Constraint 12 Transitions Must Occur Over States Defined For the Class
This and the next constraint ensure that references within a dynamic model transition refer to defined elements of the class dynamic model.
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Vs : state V* : transition • ((t G this.Trans) A (s = t.current V s =
t.next)) =>• s G this.States
Constraint 13 Transitions May Only Refer to Send and Receive Events Defined
For the Class
Vt : transition Ve : event • (t G this.Trans A (e = t.receive V e G
t.Send)) =j>e£ this.Events
Constraint 14 Transitions Must be Deterministic
If multiple transitions exist from a state then they must be mutually exclusive and
an automatic transition (with a guard condition of true) is allowed only if it is the
sole transition from the state.
Vii : transition Vi2 : transition • U £ this.Trans A t2 G this.Trans A
^.current = t2.current A ^.receive = t2.receive A <i ^ f2 =>■ (h.guard A
t2.guard) — false
Vti,t2 : transition • tx.guard = true A tr.receive.name = automatic A
ti.current = t2.current A ti.next = t2.next => ti = t2
Figure 15 describes in AWL syntax the transition table for the class airframe.
An example of a deterministic set of transitions is the two transitions from the
current state poweredFlight. Although both transitions share the same guard
condition (true) determinism is ensured by each responding to a different receive
event (tankEmpty and getPosition).
Constraint 15 States Must be Mutually Exclusive
The requirement for this rule in a Mealey-based dynamic model is more than questionable as the set of transitions leading to a state fully defines the class behaviour
within the state. However, if a Moore-based dynamic model or a hybrid representation is used, then this constraint is an important one. In order that the states of a
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dynamic model be uniquely identified, the conjunction of the invariant expression of
any state with any other state must be false.
Vsi : state,Vs2; state • si,s2 G this.States A sx ^ s2 => (si.invariant A
s2.invariant) = false
Although a trivial example, Figure 16 defines the state invariants for the class
airframe. As can be obviously deducted, the conjunction of any two invariants is false
as the enumerated variable afState cannot have two different values simultaneously.

Constraint 16 State Invariants Must Be Defined Over Attributes of the Class and
Global Constants
This contention is a linking issue that is discussed in Chapter Four. Note also that
in a similar fashion to other components of the domain, state invariants should also
be type checked and not contradict the class invariant.
Vs : State Vn : dataObject • s G this.States A n G dataSet(s.inv) =» (n G
Attrs) V (n € dom.Consts)
Constraint 17 The Transition Guard Must be Defined Over Attributes of the Class,
Event Parameters and Global Constants
\/t : transition Vn : dataObject • t € this.Trans A n E dataSet(t) =*• (n €
dom.Consts) V (n £ this.Attrs)
Constraint 18 The Preconditions of a Transition Must Be Satisfiable For a Transition To Ever Take Place
This constraint ensures that the guard condition and current state invariant are
consistent with the class in order to prove that the conditions leading to a transition
are capable of being satisfied.
\/t : transition • t G this.Trans =$> (t.cur rent.invariant A this.inv A
t.guard) ^ false
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Each of the following two dynamic model constraints is based upon an implication that relies upon the preconditions of a transition holding. If the left hand
side of an implication is false, the right hand side can be true or false. The aim of
this constraint is to ensure that the left hand side of the following two constraints is
not false.

Constraint 19 The Invariant of the Next State Must be Implied by the Transition's
Guard and the Postcondition of the Action
Whereas the previous constraint dictates that the precondition of a transition hold,
essentially this constraint states that the next state invariant be a weaker expression
than the conjunction of expressions leading to the transition. The aim of this check
is to ensure that a cause and effect relationship exists between the current state, the
next state and the transition between them.
Vt : transition • (t € this.Trans A t.current.inv A t.action.post A t.guard A
this.inv) =>- t.next.inv
The structural constraint introduced at Constraint 5 states that all expressions
of the class must not contradict the class invariant and as such, the class invariant
is not explicitly included in the above proposition.
What must be kept in mind when verifying this constraint is that whichever
attributes appear in the postcondition of the action are modified values, and as such,
attributes referred to in the invariant of the next state must also be decorated with
ticks to ensure that names correctly match and the sequential nature of the transition
is maintained.

Constraint 20 The Invariant of the Send Events of a Transition Must Be Implied
By the Transition's Guard and the Postcondition of the Action
Send events generated by a transition must be consistent with the conjunction of
the expressions of the transition that lead to their generation. The aim of this check
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is to ensure that a cause-and-effect relationship exists between a transition and its
send events.
\ft : transition Ve : event • t 6 this.Trans A e 6 t.Send A t.current.inv A
t.action.post A t.guard A this.inv =4» e.inv

Constraint 21 The Precondition of an Action Must be Implied by the Conditions
of the Transition.
The precondition of an action must be satisfied by the current state invariant, the
class invariant, the guard condition and the receive event invariant for the action to
take place.
V* : transition • (t € this.Trans A this.inv A t.current.inv A t.guard A
t.receive.inv) =>• t.action.pre

Constraint 22 Receive Event Parameters Must Match Action Input Parameters
For a given transition, the signature of the action it invokes must contain the parameters of the transition receive event. Within a class dynamic model, an action refers
to a method of the class. The variables a method operates upon stem from attributes
of the class, locally defined variables and input parameters that originate from the
arguments of the receive event that resulted in the transition being triggered.
For a given action, let inParams be the set of input parameters of an action,
i.e., inParams = {p € action.Params • p.in = true}.
Vt : transition Vrx : event Vact : method • t G this.Trans A rx =
t.receive A act = t.action =>■ rx.Params C act.inParams

Constraint 23 Send Event Parameters Must Match Action Output Parameters
Similar to the above constraint, for a given transition, action output parameters
must form the set parameters of the set of send events of the transition.
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For a given action, let outParams be the set of output parameters of an action,
i.e., outParams = {p € action.Params • p.out = true}.
Vt : transition Mtx : event Vact: method • t £ this.Trans A tx E t.receive A
act = t.action =>■ tx.Params C act.outParams

3.4

Domain Level Verification
The focus of concern at the domain level is the interaction between classes and

their associations. An example of domain level interaction is the relationship between
send and receive events of different classes, while an example of an association would
be an aggregation.
34.I

Structural Model.

Constraint 24 Associations Must Refer to Classes Defined Within the Domain
For an association to exist and have meaning in a domain, there must also exist the
constituent classes that make up its ends. Below, assocEnd is used to identify an
end of an association.
\/assoc : association Vclassi,class2 : class • assoc £ dom.Assocs A classi G
dom.Classes A class2 G dom.Classes =4> assoc.endi = classi.name A assoc.end2 —
class2.name
This and the following structural model constraints are enforced during the
linking phase of the analysis model creation—refer to Chapter Four for a description
of the linking process.
Constraint 25 Associative Objects Must Refer to Classes Within the Domain
This constraint is merely a specialization of Constraint 24.
Constraint 26 Aggregation Must Refer to Classes Within the Domain
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Another special case of association, aggregation, is worth discussing in a little more
depth due to the fact that aggregation may represented in more than one fashion
and hence requires special consideration.
In AWSOME, aggregation may be represented as a special form of association,
Figure 17, or somewhat more implicitly, as a class attribute, Figure 18.
In its first form, this constraint of aggregation is formalized by Constraint 1
while in its second form Constraint 24 expresses the required constraint.
3.4.2 Functional Model.

Domain level rules dealing with the functional

model are predominantly concerned with the invocation of methods—that is, who is
capable invoking a method and the consistency of the call made.
Constraint 27 Operation Calls Must Match Signatures
The signature of an operation describes the set of formal parameters that declare
its input and output characteristics. Each parameter is represented by an identifier,
data type, and in/out qualifier. For the purposes of this research, no parameter
is allowed to be used for both input and output as this greatly complicates the
verification process. AWSOME however, is capable of modeling in/out parameters.
W : transition Vop : operationCall Vact : action • t £ this.Trans A act £
this.Ops A act.name = op.name A #1 op.Args = #act => (Vi : J\f • i 6 domA A
A(i).type = P(i).type
3.4.3 Dynamic Model.

The majority of verifiable rules related to the

dynamic model are applied at the class-level. As long as there exists a correlation
between events of classes within the domain model, domain-level dynamic modeling
is verified.
Constraint 28 Objects May Only Communicate Via Send and Receive Events
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The interaction of objects within a domain—that is, how they communicate, how
aware they are of each others' existence and their ability to invoke each others' operations is a point of contention in the field of object oriented software engineering
and as such, this research has adopted the strict constraint that class-level communication is to occur through the sending and receiving of events only.

Constraint 29 All States Should be Reachable
In this research, it is assumed each class has an initial state named "start". Start is a
magical state in which each class begins and therefore, no transition is needed to it.
However, every other state requires not only a transition to it but a transition whose
receive event and guard condition are capable of being satisfied. That is, there exists
a corresponding send event in another object and the guard must not contradict the
class invariant.
This rule does not constrain the analysis model such that all states must be
reachable—the intent is to generate a warning to the software engineer that there
exist certain states within the domain that are not capable of being reached. Specification reuse may mean that certain class properties are irrelevant to a specific
domain; alternatively the warning may bring to light an actual oversight of the
model.
The following rule states that for each receive event in the domain, there must
be a corresponding send event.
VCl : class Vi : transition • t G cx.trans => (3c2 : class 3t2 : transition •
t2 G c2.Trans A t^.receive e t2.Send
An example of an unreachable state is maneuvering in the AWSOME syntax
transition table of Figure 15. The absence of any transition to the state is the culprit
in this case and as such, a warning to the software engineer should be generated.
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3.5

Summary
This chapter introduced a set of formal constraints that an object oriented

analysis model must satisfy in order to ensure consistency and completeness. Each
constraint is formalized according to the semantics of a domain model introduced
early in the chapter. The constraints are grouped depending upon which model of
the Object Modeling Technique [Rumbaugh] they are appropriate and whether they
are a class- or domain-level issue. The next chapter discusses the implementation of
the testing of the constraints proposed within this chapter.
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type flightDirectorStates is (startflightDirector, idleflightDirector,
maneuveringflightDirector);

class flightDirector is
private flightDirectorState : flightDirectorStates;
private procedure initializeO
guarantees flightDirectorState' = idleflightDirector
dynamic model is
event errorSignalsO;
event initFlightDirectorO ;
event maneuverComplete();
state start invariant flightDirectorState = startflightDirector;
state idle invariant flightDirectorState = idleflightDirector;
state maneuvering invariant flightDirectorState = maneuveringflightDirector;
transition table is
in start on initFlightDirector if true do
initializeFlightDirectorO; to idle;
in idle on errorSignals if true send changeCourseO; setElevationO;
setThrottle(); to maneuvering;
in maneuvering on maneuverComplete if true to idle;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
Figure 14.

Declaration of the Type FlightDirectorStates and the Class FlightDirector

transition table is
in initial on initAirframe if true to airframelnit;
in airframelnit on AUTOMATIC if true send initDone() ;
to poweredFlight;
in poweredFlight on tankEmpty if true to inertialFlight;
in poweredFlight on getPosition if true send positionCurrentO;
to poweredFlight;
in maneuvering on doManeuverComplete if true to poweredFlight;
end transition table;
Figure 15.

AWSOME Syntax Transition Table
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State
state
state
state
state

start invariant afState = start;
aiframelnit invariant afState = aflnit;
poweredFlight invariant afState = poweredFlight;
maneuvering invariant afState = maneuvering;
inertialFlight invariant afState = inertial;
Figure 16.

State Invariant for the Class Airframe

aggregation propels is
parent missile : cruiseMissile multiplicity One;
child propulsion : propulsionSystem multiplicity One;
end aggregation;
Figure 17.

Aggregation Represented Via Association.

class cruiseMissile is
private propulsion : propulsionSystem;
private frame : airframe;
private payload : warhead;
private avionics : avionicsSoftware;
private cmState : cmStates;
end class;

Figure 18.

Aggregation Represented Via Class Attribute.
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IV. Implementation
4-1

Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to expand upon each of the constraints introduced

in Chapter Three by detailing their implementations. Descriptions of the process
by which an AWSOME analysis model is specified and its representations for the
theorem prover Z/Eves and dynamic model verifier Spin are also given.
The constraints of Chapter Three are best suited to several forms of verification:
1. Some of the simpler, static, constraints are checked directly on the AST, such
as those addressed by name analysis and type checking.
2. Some constraints require logical inference (such as 19, 20 and 21), thus a theorem prover is required.

The theorem prover Z/Eves is used to automate

verification of these constraints.
3. The dynamic model supports specialized analysis for which tools exist. The
dynamic model checker Spin is used to verify constraints such as 14 and 29.
In order to keep the methods independent of the manner in which a system
is specified, the majority of verification techniques used focus upon the AWSOME
analysis AST. That is, no matter if a system is specified in Z, AWL or via the object
editor, so long as it may be stored in the analysis AST these tests can be performed
upon it. If the tests had been made input dependent then a new series would be
required for each method of input to the analysis AST. However, this has occurred
on occasion, where the parser's syntax has defined certain rules that a specification
must follow. Other developers must be aware of these factors when designing new
methods of analysis AST creation. These grammar-enforced rules will be discussed
throughout the chapter.
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This chapter is structured in a similar fashion to that of Chapter 3—addressing
each constraint presented in the methodology and how its verification was implemented.
4.2

Limitations Placed Upon AWSOME Models in This Research
In order to ensure compatibility with Z/Eves and Spin, the following con-

straints are placed upon AWL:
1. no underscores are permissible,
2. string values must be introduced as a constant of type string with the value

0,
3. no parameters may be of both in and out modes, and
4. dynamic models that use automatic transitions must declare an AUTOMATIC
event.
It should be noted that the majority of these limitations are rather easy but
time consuming to rectify.
4.3

Creating AWSOME Analysis Models
This section of the chapter details the manner in which a domain model is

created and verified in AWSOME:
1. specification generation in AWSOME syntax,
2. parsing the specification into an AWSOME analysis AST,
3. generation of symbol tables that manage name spaces,
4. linking of identifiers with their respective identifier references throughout the
analysis AST, and
5. semantic analysis.
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The AWSOME Class Model.

The structure of an AWSOME AST is described by AWSOME's metamodel.
The AWSOME metamodel takes the form of an 00 inheritance hierarchy—it has approximately 100 classes (termed WsClasses) that are used to model a wide spectrum
of object-oriented programming components. Portions of the AWSOME analysis
AST especially pertinent to this research include the WsClass and its aggregate
components illustrated in Figure 37.
A system may be specified in AWL and, via parsing, be transformed into an
AWSOME AST. However, parsing AWL files is not the only method by which specifications may be transformed into AWSOME ASTs and as such there is a need to
explicitly define the AWSOME syntax so that tools made subsequently comply with
the rules that the parser enforces. If these productions are not enforced, the correct and complete operation of the verification techniques proposed in this research
cannot be guaranteed. AWL production rules are included at Appendix A.
The following subsections detail the process followed to generate an AWL specification and the specification's subsequent verification and validation.
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4-3.1

Problem Domain Specification.

Presently, a user may specify a prob-

lem domain via creation of an AWL file or the use of a GUI object editor. It is
envisaged that, via an elictor harvester, the software engineer will harvest applicable
classes from the existing knowledge base and then specify any deficiencies in AWL
syntax. This specification is saved as an AWL file and may then be read by the
parser.
4.3.2

Parsing AWL.

The AWSOME parser produced in conjunction with

AFIT faculty is responsible for verifying the syntactic rules of a specification generated in AWL. The product of the syntactically correct specification is an AST based
upon WsClasses. It must noted, however, that the parser requires identifiers to be
placed in AWL syntactically correct positions, but at no point does it ensure that
the AST is semantically correct.
4.3.3

AWSOME AST Scoping.

The first stage in ensuring the correctness

of an AWSOME specification is the generation of a symbol table that maintains a
list of the declarations visible at any point in the AST.
Certain WsClasses within an AST make declarations that should be only visible
to certain other components of the AST. That is, references should be made solely
to those components declared within the list of open scopes. Take for example class
attributes —the object-oriented concept of data hiding requires that a class keep its
data objects hidden from the outside environment, and as such requires the creation
of a scope within which these attributes are declared and visible.
The symbol table affords the capability to ensure that declarations of the same
name and category are not allowed within the list of open scopes and as such, reduces the possibility for name ambiguity in the specification and errors in object
referencing.
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4-34

AWSOME AST Linking.

Once it has been ensured that no com-

ponents of the same category exist within a mutually open scope, it is possible to
link references to declarations with the declared object and raise critical errors or
warnings to notify the formalist of incompatible types.
4.3.5

Semantic Analysis.

From the analysis AST is generated both a

Z/BT£JXfile and a Promela file. The Z/#T£Xfile may then be inspected with Z/Eves
in order to prove properties of the specification, and the Promela file may be executed
in Spin to highlight any further dynamic model concerns.
These two tools do not address other semantic concerns of the analysis model
such as standard compiler-like checking of method signatures and return type consistency. It is envisaged that such checks will be applied to the analysis AST directly
by another visitor and do not provide any value to the research interests of this work.
The checks implemented as part of this research are more complex. They require
deeper levels of analysis such as theorem proving, exhaustive enumeration of state
spaces and simulation.
Table 1 summarizes the responsibility, implementation status and automatability of each of the proposed constraints with respect to the components discussed
in this section.
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SPIN and Z/Eves
While numerous extensions to Z exist to cater for object-oriented analysis,

methods of this research do not modify Z in any fashion—elements of the dynamic
model that are difficult to express in Z syntax are specified in the process modeling
language Promela. This ensures that the theorem prover behaves as expected and
does not result in a less applicable, more esoteric strain of the Z virus. The use of
an interactive theorem prover such as Z/Eves allows for modification of the Z model
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X
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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

Table 1.

X

Constraint Verification Responsibility.
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prior to modification of the specification to test various hypotheses without having
to modify the specification repeatedly to catch a single inconsistency.
SPIN's applicability to this research was essentially limited to state reachability
analysis performed via the use of an exhaustive state space search. It became evident,
however, that its use is inappropriate for the verification of OMT dynamic models.
SPIN's inability to completely represent OMT dynamic models stems from its limited
range of data types (numerical types of different sizes) and lack of expressive power
in representation of propositions such as invariants and pre- and postconditions.
This does not mean that SPIN is a poor tool—its use is extensive around the
world in dynamic model verification.
4-5 Z and Promela Generation
Both the Z and Promela specifications are generated from the analysis AST via
the use of the design pattern termed the visitor [Gamma]. A visitor allows for the
addition of functionality to certain object-oriented systems without the requirement
to modify the classes of the structure, therefore maintaining AWSOME's conceptual
integrity.
Neither the Z nor Promela transformations provide a complete representation
of the entire 00A model. Only a sufficient amount of the model is transformed
to allow for the generation of theorems that express the constraints established in
Chapter Three.
The Z specification visitor outputs a specification in the formal language Z,
complete with theorems and proof commands aimed at verifying the constraints
proposed. The Promela specification visitor outputs a Promela file for execution in
Spin.
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Domain

&
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pre- & post-conditions

Figure 20.
4-6

Invariant

Invariant

From AWSOME Analysis model to Z Schemas.

Modeling a Domain in Z
The representation of object-oriented systems with the formal language Z is

not by any means a new concept. Familiarity with Z while studying at AFIT and the
availability of a free theorem prover with satisfactory support were key determinants
in the decision to make use of Z as an analysis model representation for the purposes
of verification in this research.
4-6.1

Structural Model in Z.

The following subsections detail how certain

OOA concepts are represented by the Z specification generator produced as part of
this research. Figure 20 illustrates the mapping from an OMT structural model to
its representation in Z.
4.6.I.I

Types.

Abstract types are represented as identified sets. An

example in the cruise missile model is the type character. This will be represented
by [char] in the Z analysis model. Note that enumerated types are fully defined, e.g.,
AWSOME syntax for the states of the class airframe is:
type afStates is (start, aflnit, onCourse, maneuvering, inertial);
which is transformed into the Z syntax below:
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afStates ::= start | aflnit | onCourse | maneuvering | inertial
The only types inherent to Z are the integers Z and the set of naturals M'.
Therefore, a fixed point approximation was required for real numbers. The chosen
approximation is to multiply by an order of magnitude equal to the decimal resolution
required, e.g., for a real with a range from 1.0 to 10.0 with a delta of 0.001, the type
was represented by an integer of range 1 x 103 to 10 x 103. Obviously, this raises
inaccuracies in scale when dealing with operations such as division and multiplication
and therefore, checking of real types must take this into account. Floating point types
are represented by integers in a similar fashion to that of fixed point real numbers.
For most purposes, knowing that the type is a form of number is enough to allow
model verification to continue.
Integer types—subtypes of Z—are represented by axiomatic definitions that
declare the type's identifier and its range restrictions.
Z has no intrinsic representation character or string types or literals. Without
defining character in Z as an enumerated type that contains the entire character set,
literal strings (sequences of characters) must all be defined as global constants equal
to the empty sequence. To provide a literal string with any value would not make
sense as character is defined as an abstract type.
4.6.1.2

Classes.

The structural model of a class is represented by a

static schema. The name of the schema corresponds to that of the class, the signature
of the schema describes the attributes of the class whilst the predicate describes the
class invariant. An example class is illustrated in Figure 21.
4.6.1.3

Associations.

Associations are generally handled as static

Schemas. The name of the schema is that of the association, the signature of the
schema defines the end roles of the association and the predicate describes multiplicities of the end roles. It must be noted that the special form of association,

65

, cruiseMissile
propulsion : propulsionSystem
frame : air frame
payload : warhead
avionics : avionicsSoftware
cmState : cmStates

Figure 21.

Aggregation Represented Via Aggregate Class Schema.

.propels
_
a : propulsionSystem <-» cruiseMissile
Va; 6 domfl#(a; < a) < 1
Vy e rana#(y> a) > 0

Figure 22.

Aggregation Represented Via Association Schema.

aggregation, may also be represented via the addition of the aggregate component
as an attribute of the aggregate class.
AWSOME facilitates both methods of describing an aggregation as does the Zschema generator created as part of this research. The two alternate representations
of the cruiseMissile/propulsionSystem aggregation are illustrated in Figure 21 and
Figure 22.
4.6.2

Functional Model in Z.

The methods constituting a class' functional

model are represented by dynamic schemas. Dynamic Schemas reference the class by
delta inclusion (represented by A className in the schema signature), thus identifying the schema as a method that may result in a change in class attributes. Figure
23 illustrates the mapping of an AWL class operation to its representation in Z.
An example of a method specified in AWL and expressed as a Z schema is given in
Figures 24 and 25, respectively.
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Class

—o—
Method
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Subprogram
SubProgramName-

^

A.

className

parameter?: type
parameter!: type
Formal
Parameter

Local
Variable

Postcondition

Precondition

local: type
precondition
postcondition

Figure 23.

From Class Method to Dynamic Schema.

private procedure changeFlow(actualFlowRate : in bigReal)
guarantees outputFlowRate' = actualFlowRate? and
fuelLevel' = fuelLevel and capacity' = capacity and
tankWeight' = tankWeight and fuelDensity' = fuelDensity
Figure 24.

AWSOME Syntax For the Method ChangeFlow.

At the analysis level, AWSOME defines class methods via pre- and postcondition expressions (identified by the keywords "assumes" and "guarantees" respectively). It is these expressions that form the predicate of the method's dynamic
schema.
Note, it is considered that if a variable is not explicitly changed with a tick (')
then it remains unchanged as opposed to being considered neglected and therefore
an error in the specification.
4.6.3

Dynamic Model in Z.

Dynamic models in AWSOME are comprised

of a set of states, a set of events, and a set of transitions. The set of transitions
define the relation between elements of the two former sets.
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. changeFlow
AmissileFuelTank
actual Flow Rate? : bigReal
output Flow Rate' = actual Flow Rate? A fuelLevel' — fuelLevel
A capacity' — capacity A tankWeight' = tankW'eight A
fuelDensity' = fuelDensity

Figure 25.

Dynamic Schema For the Method ChangeFlow.
WsTransition

^y
currentState

receiveEvent

Figure 26.
4-6.3.1

guard

sendEvents

nextState

WsTransition and its Aggregate Components.

States.

A static schema is created for each state of the anal-

ysis model and the state invariant, if any, is added to the schema's predicate.
4.6.3.2

Transitions.

Transitions in AWSOME consist of a cur-

rentState, receiveEvent, guard, action, sendEvent(s), and a nextState (see Figure
26). Transitions are capable of containing a great deal of propositional calculus—
both the current and next states contain invariants, as does each send event and
the receive event, the guard condition is a Boolean expression, and the action has
pre- and postconditions. From this information it can be established that the guards
are consistent and complete, transitions are deterministic, and that all states are
uniquely identifiable.
No Z construct is capable of representing an entire OOA transition. A number
of Z/Eves theorems are generated for each transition in order to test its consistency
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and completeness with respect to the constraints proposed in Chapter Three (refer
to Constraints 18, 19, and 20 for elaboration).

4-7

Verifying Components and Domain Checking With Z/Eves
Relevant analysis model information is harvested from the analysis AST in

accordance with the methodology of Section 4.5 and used in the creation of a Z/Eves
compatible representation. This representation, in the form of a .zed file, may then
be loaded into the Z/Eves environment and the verification goals of this research
tested.
This section of the chapter introduces the concept of domain checking as performed by Z/Eves. A more thorough explanation is given in the Z/Eves Reference
Manual [reference manual 1.5]. Domain checking automatically occurs when a paragraph1 is entered in the Z/Eves interactive mode or if the command check is executed
upon a batch input styled Z-section.
Z syntax allows for the specification of expressions whose semantics are nonsensical [reference manual 1.5]. Two ways that semantic correctness can be compromised
are:
1. application of a function outside its domain such as max J\f or 1 div 0,
2. a proposition is not meaningful if there does not exist a single value for a term
such that the predicate holds. For example, Vn:A/'»n>5An<5.
Z/Eves may be used to check each paragraph of a Z section specification to
ensure that function applications are meaningful and that all propositions are semantically correct.
Domain checking provides the backbone of all structural, functional, and the
majority of dynamic model semantic analysis performed as part of this research. The
1

Z paragraphs include abstract types, Schemas, axiomatic definitions and theorems.
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Symbol Grammatical type
e

P,Q
ST
SE
D
n
Table 2.

expression
predicate
schema-text
schema-exp
decl-part
name
Domain Check Notation.

constraints whose implementation are mentioned in this chapter are predominantly
performed during domain checking of the analysis specification.
The remainder of this section details the domain checking applied to each
form of Z paragraph. A brief description is given prior to the specification of each
domain check as described in the Z/Eves Reference Manual. In order to simplify the
expressions that follow, the symbols in Table 2 are introduced.
4-7.1

Abstract and Enumerated Types.

Abstract and enumerated types are

the easiest elements of a specification to verify as they are simply names and are
always considered to be true for the purposes of domain checking, i.e., DC([n,...]) =
true, where DC represents a domain check and n is the name of the abstract type or
the range of enumerated values.
Abstract types have no constraints or operations defined for them other than
equality 2 while enumerated types have no constraints or operations defined for them
other than equality and test of set membership i.e., membership in the type.
4-7.2

Declarations.

Named variables are introduced via declarations. The

visibility of declarations is dependent upon where the declaration is made. The visibility of a variable in Z/Eves is either global or local. Declarations made within
an axiomatic definition have global visibility beginning from the end of the decla2

AWSOME provides other operators for enumerated types such as < and > but these operators
are not defined for enumerated types in either of the verification tools used in this research
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ration and spanning the remainder of the specification (i.e., variables may not be
referenced prior to their declaration) while declarations made within the signature
of a schema remain local to the schema signature and predicate. However, schema
inclusion-used in this research to represent methods, states, events, aggregation
and inheritance-may be used to introduce variables defined within other Schemas
into the one currently being declared.
A Z/Eves declaration is structured as follows:
declaration

:: basic-decl;...;basic-decl

basic-decl

::

decl-name-list

:: decl-name,...,decl-name

decl-name-list : expression j schema-ref

Domain checking (DC) of a declaration is dependent upon the form of the
declaration-the DC of a name with an expression is simply the domain check applied
to the expression, the DC of a set of expressions of a schema is the conjunction of
the DC of each schema-expression and so on.

4-7.3

DC(n,...:e)

= DC(e)

DC(S[e,...])

= DC(e)A...

DC(D;D')

= DC(D)ADC(D')

Schemas.

Schemas are used to represent classes, states, events, and

methods of an AWSOME analysis model. A schema consists of a set of declarations
(D) located in the schema signature and a set of propositions (P) located in the
schema predicate. Domain checking of a schema entails domain checking the set of
declarations and checking propositions over the relevant declaration domains.
DC(Schema) = DC(D) A (VZ) . DC(P)), where D is the set of declarations in the
schema signature and P is the set of propositions of the schema predicate.
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4.7.4

Axiomatic Definitions.

Axiomatic definitions may be used to rep-

resent types with constraints, for example, an integer with constrained upper and
lower bounds. The type's name and the fact that it is an integer are declared in the
axiomatic definition's signature while the bounds form the predicate.
Domain checking of an axiomatic definition checks the declaration and the
propositions of the predicate over the domain of the relevant declarations.
DC(Axiom) = DC(D) A (V£> • DC{P) A DC(Q A ...), where P and Q are
propositions of the axiom predicate.
4-7.5

Schema Expressions.

The composition of schema expressions in

Z/Eves is as follows:
schema-exp

:: V schema-text • schema-exp
3 schema-text • schema-exp |
31 schema-text • schema-exp |
schema-exp-1

schema-exp-1

:: schema-ref |
-1 schema-exp-1 |
pre schema-exp-1 |
schema-exp-1 A schema-exp-1 |
schema-exp-1 V schema-exp-1 |
schema-exp-1 => schema-exp-1
schema-exp-1 <$ schema-exp-1
(schema-exp-1)

The domain checking of schema expressions is:
DC(VD I P • SE) = DC(D) A(VD • DC(P))ADC(SE)
DC(3D I P • SE) = as above
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DCßjD I P • SE) = as above

4.7.6

Schema Texts.

Schema expressions are comprised of sets of schema

text where each schema text consists of a declaration and an optional set of predicates, i.e.,
schema-exp-1

:: [schema-text]

schema-text

:: declaration [|predicate]

Domain checking schema texts is very similar to domain checking a schema—
the declarations are domain checked and predicates are checked over the domain of
the declaration, i.e., DC([D|P]) = DC(D)A(VD •DC(P))
4.7.7 Schema References.

Schema references are optionally prefix-decorated

schema names. Schema references are used in this research to represent class methods, inheritance and aggregation (methods are either functions or procedures and
are distinguished by the prefixes S and A respectively). The schema name refers to
the name of the class schema that the method belongs to.
Aggregation and inheritance schema references are not decorated as they are
used to declare schema inclusion within the scope of the class being declared.

schema-ref

[prefix] word

schema-text

declaration [|predicate]

prefix

A IS

Domain checking of schema references entails domain checking of the schema
referred to (if not already done) and any expression that forms part of the declaration
and is defined as: DC(S[X,Y][x/y,z:=e])=DC(X) A DC(Y) A DC(e).
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4-7.8

ZI Eves Prove By Reduce.

The most frequent Z/Eves command

issued in this research is prove by reduce. The command prove by reduce instructs
Z/Eves to apply simplification, rewriting, and replacement until the theorem can be
no further reduced. Typically, the aim of prove by simplification is to establish a
theorem as true, false or not equal to false.
Simplification results in Z/Eves performing equality and integer reasoning,
propositional reasoning and tautology checking.

Rewriting applies simplification

and attempts to simplify the theorem by matching propositions to known patterns.
Replacement entails replacing any schema references with their respective definitions.
Figure 27 contains a sample of the output generated by Z/Eves. The first portion is the output generated from domain checking of the schema missileFuelTank.
The second portion, beginning at "theorem inheritance", is the proof of a theorem
that attempts to verify that missileFuelTank's invariant does not conflict with that
of fuelTank. Unfortunately, this proof did not work as anticipated, the superclass
schema was reduced to true prior to any further analysis—the proposed solution is to
include only the superclass invariant instead of the entire schema—refer to Constraint
6 for further details. The final section of the output, identified by "theorem initializeMissileFuelTankisok" attempts to verify that the operation initializeFuelTank does
not conflict with the class invariant. For the purposes of this example, the postcondition was modified such that it was inconsistent with missileFuelTank's invariant
and Z/Eves returned the proof result "false".

4-8

Modeling a Domain in Promela
In addition to Z/Eves, Spin is used for part of the dynamic model's verifica-

tion process. The selection of Promela and Spin was made due to the ease of use
of the language Promela and the concurrent research conducted by Lacey that resulted in the presence of an active knowledge base of the tool's use at AFIT [Lacey].
The Promela code is generated from the analysis model and focuses solely on class
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schema missileFuelTank
... theorem missileFuelTank\$domainCheck
... axiom missileFuelTank\$declarationPart
Beginning proof of missileFuelTank\$domainCheck ...
fuelTank \\
\land fixedWeight \in realWeight \\
\land tankWeight \in realWeight \\
\land capacity \in bigReal \\
\land inputFlowRate \in bigReal \\
\implies (fuelDensity * capacity, 2) \in \dom (\_ \div \_)
theorem inheritance
... theorem inheritance
Beginning proof of inheritance ...
\exists missileFuelTank @ fuelTank
Which simplifies
forward chaining using KnownMember\$declarationPart, knownMember,
fuelTank\$declarationPart, missileFuelTank\$declarationPart, '[internal items]'
with the assumptions '[internal items]'to ...
\exists missileFuelTank @ true
Proving gives ...
\exists missileFuelTank 0 true
schema initializeMissileFuelTank
... schema \Delta missileFuelTank
... axiom Delta\$missileFuelTank\$declarationPart
... axiom initializeMissileFuelTank\$declarationPart
theorem initializeMissileFuelTankisok
... theorem initializeMissileFuelTankisok
Beginning proof of initializeMissileFuelTankisok ...
\exists missileFuelTank @ initializeMissileFuelTank
Which simplifies
with invocation of fuelTank, missileFuelTank, \Delta missileFuelTank,
initializeMissileFuelTank
when rewriting with notEqRule
forward chaining using Delta\$missileFuelTank\$declarationPart,
initializeMissileFuelTank\$declarationPart, KnownMember\$declarationPart,

Figure 27.

Example Z/Eves Output
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knownMember, fuelTank\$declarationPart, missileFuelTank\$declarationPart,
'[internal items]'
with the assumptions '&neq$declaration', select\_2\_l, select\_2\_2,
realWeight\$declaration, bigReal\$declaration, '[internal items] ' to ...
false
Proving gives ...
false
Figure 27.

Example Z/Eves Output Cont.

TT

currentState

receiveEvent

guard

:: receiveEvent; guard -> action; sendEvent; gotoState
:: receiveEvent; guard -> action; sendEvent; gotoState
od;

Figure 28.

From WsTransition to Promela.

dynamic models within the domain. Figure 28 illustrates the mapping of an AWL
dynamic model to its representation in Promela.
4.8.1

Send and Receive Events.

Classes communicate via events and these

events are defined as messages in Promela. The first step in the generation of a
Promela file is to harvest these events from the analysis model and add their identifiers to the enumerated set "mtype". As an example, the class airframe would result
in the events initAirframe, tankEmpty, getPosition, changeCourse, and doManeuverComplete being added to the mtype resulting in a declaration of the form:
mtype = {initAirframe, tankEmpty, getPosition, changeCourse, doManeuverComplete};
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4-8.2

Event Maps.

The send and receive event names of different classes

may well not be the same even though they correspond to the same event. This
is due to the fact that possibly not all classes in the domain model were created
according to the same standard, either because they were developed by different
parties or never actually considered for integration into the same domain model.
The possibility of incompatible dynamic models is what drives the requirement
for domain event maps. An event map declares an association between a pair of
events in differing classes so as to make integration into the same analysis model
a simpler task than requiring the re-specification of the offending dynamic models.
AWSOME facilitates domain mapping. However, at this point in time, neither the
AWSOME parser nor language provides support for event maps.
It is assumed for the purposes of this research that event names match and
as such, there is no need for event maps. If there were, however, a need for event
maps, they would be defined as "channels" in Promela. Only a single global channel
is required upon which all events are broadcast. Its syntax is:
chan global = [0] of {mtype}
The above declares a channel "global" of buffer size 0 that carries messages
of type mtype. Spin's ability to model temporal systems has resulted in channel
definitions stipulating a buffer size. For a non-temporal, object-oriented analysis
this buffer size is set to 0—that is, a broadcast event ceases to exist as soon as the
next event is broadcast.
4-8.3

Class Dynamic Models.

Classes are modeled in Promela as process

types (proctypes). Within the proctype are defined the states and their respective
transitions as illustrated in Figure 29. It can be seen that the airframe dynamic
model is declared as proctypecruiseMissile, the states by their name catenated with
State, and the transitions within the current state's do..od loop.
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I

proctypeairframe()
{
startState:
do
:: (map31?initAirframe; true) -> initializeAirframe;

goto preLaunch

od;
preLaunchState:
do
:: (mapl2?doLaunch; true) ->
od;

goto poweredFlight

poweredFlightState:
do
(mapl4?out0fFuel; true) -> goto inertialFlight
(mapl3?estimatePosition; true) -> setPosition; goto poweredFlight
(map6?changeCourse; true) -> goto maneuvering
od;
maneuveringState:
do
:: (map7?doManeuverComplete; true) -> goto poweredFlight
:: (mapl4?out0fFuel; true) -> goto inertialFlight
od;
inertialFlightState:
do
od;
}

Figure 29.

Example Promela Proctype.
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Each transition is of the form
(receiveEvent;guardCondition) -> action; sendEvents; goto nextState

The parentheses around the receive event and guard condition are required because of the fact that Spin will not ensure that both are satisfied prior to beginning
a transition. That is, if the receive event holds, Spin will select a corresponding transition without considering whether the guard condition also holds and will then wait
until that guard condition is satisfied. Therefore without the parentheses, if multiple
transitions are triggered by the same receive event but different guard conditions,
Spin will arbitrarily pick a transition and lock. The addition of the parentheses
ensures the set of transitions is deterministic (if they are indeed deterministic) and
that only the transition that satisfies both the receive event and the guard condition
is selected for execution.
For situations where transitions are automatic or where transitions have no
guard conditions, two constants have been added to the model. AH analysis models
created for this research use the receive event "automatic" to denote an automatic
transition and the guard "true" for transitions with no guard. Both automatic and
true are set to the Boolean value true and are therefore always executable to Spin.
4.8.4

Verifying Components With Spin.

Spin facilitates verification of the

reachability of states. Whereas Z/Eves is used to ensure that sets of transitions are
deterministic and that states are uniquely identifiable, Spin is used to simulate the
dynamic model and ensure that transitions may be satisfied and all states visited.
Evaluation of state reachability is instigated via prepending the keyword
"progress" to the state name. Spin then ensures that the states so annotated are
visited during execution or it returns an error message acknowledging the failure to
reach such states.
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4-9

The Semantic Analyzer
The verification performed using Z/Eves and Spin is a form of semantic analysis

but it is by no means exhaustive. Many facets of an AWSOME AST that require
analysis are outside the scope of this research and as such, should be dealt with by a
separate semantic analysis visitor that is capable of traversing the analysis AST in a
similar fashion to other visitors implemented in this research. The semantic analyzer
would be responsible for semantic analysis not addressed by either Z/Eves or Spin.
Some of the areas not analyzed by Z/Eves and Spin that are pertinent to an
analysis model include:

• method signature and method call signature consistency (required for verification of Constraint 27),
• type compatibility and type equivalence (required for complete verification of
Constraint 9),
• resolution of return types (required for complete verification of Constraint 9),
• other semantic analysis considerations include facets that are outside the scope
of an analysis model-occurring in the AWSOME design AST such as: records,
arrays, and method body statements.

4-10

Class-Level Structural Verification

Constraint 1 Attributes Must be Declared Over Defined Types
Two methods are immediately available to ensure that each data object belongs to a
defined type. The first is via the use of the linking visitor-identifierRefs are matched
by name and category to identifier symbols present in the symbol table generated
by the symbol table visitor. If no defined type exists within the set of open scopes
then the linking visitor returns a warning informing the software engineer of the
specification's incompleteness.
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The other option is to use Z/Eves to perform a type checking run over the
Z section. The command check type checks the entire Z section and is far more
economical and expedient than checking the model declaration by declaration. Both
options were used to successfully check that attribute references conformed with this
constraint.

Constraint 2 Any Variable Referenced Within an Object's Invariant Proposition
Must be Constants or Attributes of the Object
The linking process will highlight if an identifierRef refers to a declaration that is
not within the set of open scopes but it is not presently capable of fully enforcing
such a rule as this. There are three other methods of verifying that the specification
adheres to this rule. The first is via domain checking in the Z/Eves environment, the
second is via use of manual inspection and is most easily performed upon the class
Z-schema. The third option would be the use of a static semantic analysis visitor
such as the one that is still in the conceptual phase of development at this time.
Both the linker and Z/Eves domain check were used successfully to check for
conformity with this constraint.

Constraint 3 Pre- and Postconditions Must be Consistent With the Class Invariant

This constraint is checked via the use of a Z/Eves theorem.

The intent of the

theorem is to prove that an instance of the class may exist for which the pre- and
postconditions of the operation are consistent with the class invariant. The theorem
to check the consistency of the operation initializeMissileFuelTank with its class
missileFuelTank is given in Figure 30.

Constraint 4 Invariant Propositions Must be Consistent With Respect to the Attributes Types Over Which They Refer
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\begin{theorem}{iiiitializeMissileFuelTankIsOk}
\exists missileFuelTank \spot initializeMissileFuelTank
\end{theorem}
prove by reduce;
Figure 30.

Theorem to Check Operation Expression Consistency With Class Invariant

\begin{theorem}{initializeMissileFuelTankIsOk}
\exists missileFuelTank \spot true
\end{theorem}
prove by reduce;
Figure 31.

Theorem to Instantiate a Class

Verification of the consistency of a class invariant with respect to the attribute types
it refers to is achievable with the Z/Eves theorem prover. A class invariant is represented in the predicate of the corresponding class schema and any proposition
associated with a type is present in the type's schema.
By proving that an instance of the class may exist, it follows that the class
invariant is consistent with the attribute types to which it refers.

The required

theorem to verify this constraint is illustrated in Figure 31.

Constraint 5 Class Invariants Should be Consistent With Other Expressions of the
Class
Expressions capable of occurring within a class:
1. method pre- and postconditions,
2. transition guards,
3. state invariants,
4. event preconditions, and
5. the data types referenced.
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It must be ensured that these expressions are consistent with the class invariant.
The relation between invariant and data type expressions and verification of this
rule was discussed in Constraint 4.
Constraint 3 details the consistency check applied to operation pre- and postconditions while the consistency of transition guards with respect to the class invariant is addressed in Section 4.12.
State and event invariant consistency is checked in the same fashion as operations are checked in Constraint 3, that is, a theorem is used in an attempt to invoke
an instance of the class for which the state or event invariant holds does not cause
an inconsistency.

Constraint 6 Propositions of a Subclass Must be Consistent With Those of the
Superclass
A theorem that instantiates an object of the subclass will return an error if the
subclass invariant is inconsistent with respect to superclass invariant. The output of
the Z/Eves visitor attempts to instantiate an object of every class as illustrated in
Figure 31. This instantiation fails for a subclass invariant that is inconsistent with
that of its superclass as the superclass invariant is implicitly included via schema
inclusion.
Note that the functional and dynamic models are not further verified with
respect to inheritance. These issues are addressed in the Future Work section of
Chapter Six.

Constraint 7 Propositions of a Sublass Must be Substitutable For Those of the Superclass
This constraint is not checked in the current visitor.

83

Checking schema initializeMissileFuelTank
Error FunctionArgType (line 186) [Type checker]: in application of
\Global (\_ \cup \_), argument 1 has the wrong type.
Error FunctionArgType (line 186) [Type checker]: in application of
\Global (\_ \cup \_), argument 2 has the wrong type.
Error TypesNotSame (line 186) [Type checker]: types of \Local
outputFlowRate'
and \Local capacity \cup \Local fuelLevel are not the same.
Error NoType (line 186) [Type checker]: can't infer type of rel-chain
operand
\Local capacity \cup \Local fuelLevel.
Figure 32.
4-11

Z/Eves Error Message For Type Incompatibility

Class-Level Functional Verification

Constraint 8 Operation Postconditions Must Maintain The Class Invariant
Verification of model conformity with this constraint is handled by the same theorem
as presented in Figure 31.

Constraint 9 Mathematical Operators Are for Mathematical Types or Explicitly
Defined for the Type
It is envisaged that the semantic analysis visitor will be capable of determining the
correctness of mathematical expressions with respect to type compatibility, return
type determination, and operator semantics. Z/Eves will return an error message
during domain checking if an operator is applied to an incompatible type.
Figure 32 illustrates what happens when an operator is applied over incompatible operands—in this case a pair of integers is being conjuncted.

Constraint 10 Pre- and Postconditions Must Refer Solely to Global Constants,
Class Attributes and Parameters
This constraint is enforced by both the linker and Z/Eves domain checking. That
is, the list of open scopes available to the method is comprised of the method scope,
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class scope, and package scope. This means that the only declarations available to
the method are local variables and formals, class attributes, and global constants.
Constraint 11 Operation Parameters Must be Defined Over Existing Types
Similar to some of the other rules, two solutions exist to this problem. Linking
will ensure that the parameter is of a declared type while Z/Eves ensures that the
method pre- and postconditions are consistent with respect to parameter types by
domain checking that is automatically done when the schema is declared for the
current proof.
This constraint is verified using the same theorem as appears in Figure 30.

4-IS

Class-Level Dynamic Verification

Constraint 12 Transitions Must Occur Over States Defined For the Class
Linking ensures that referenced states exist within the scope of the dynamic model
and notifies the software engineer of any deficiency. This constraint is also addressed
by Spin where an error message will be generated for any state that is attempted to
be transitioned that does not exist.
The error message below was generated when missileFuelTank referred to the
state noSuchState. The error message is even kind enough to inform one of the line
number where the errant reference may be located.
spin: line

46 "cruiseMissile.prm", Error: undefined label noSuchState

Constraint 13 Transitions May Only Refer to Send and Receive Events Defined
For the Class
As discussed in constraint 12, both the linker and Spin provide error messages when
this constraint fails to hold.
Spin generated the following error message when the undeclared receive event
noSuchReceiveEvent was encountered in the dynamic model of missileFuelTank.
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spin: line

46 "cruiseMissile.prm", Error: undeclared variable:

noSuchReceiveEvent
Constraint 14 Transitions Must be Deterministic
In order for the set of transitions to be deterministic, no two transitions may share the
same combination of guard condition and receive event. Spin is incapable of detecting
non-deterministic transitions, its execution simply selects the first combination of
guard and receive event that is satisfied and progresses with that transition.
Spin is capable of identifying non-deterministic transitions. When Spin executes an exhaustive state space simulation, invariably for the same set of preconditions, Spin will select the same transition. Spin returns an error message identifying
any transition that is not taken during this simulation. It is then up to the engineer,
however, to determine if the cause of this is a non-deterministic set of transitions.
A sample Spin simulation output is illustrated in Figure 35.
Constraint 15 States Must be Mutually Exclusive
In order to verify this rule, the schema corresponding to the states of the class must
be declared for the current proof in all possible permutations. The state invariant
that forms the predicate of each state schema must not be capable of being true if
any other invariant is already true for the current proof.
This constraint was removed from the final version of the verification suite as
its utility is questionable when compared to the reduction in flexibility it causes to
modeling the dynamic behavior of a system—this is elaborated upon in Chapter
Five.
Constraint 16 State Invariants Must Be Defined Over Attributes of the Class and
Global Constants
This is another linking issue—the set of open scopes for a state is the class scope,
the dynamic model scope, and the global declarations. It is the responsibility of the
86

linker to warn the software engineer of failure to comply with this rule via an error
message.

Constraint 17 The Transition Guard Must be Defined Over Attributes of the Class,
Event Parameters and Global Constants
This constraint is verified by linking the analysis AST.

Constraint 18 The Preconditions of a Transition Must Be Satisfiable For a Transition To Ever Take Place
This constraint is checked by generation of a theorem that instantiates a class and
tests to see that the conjunction of the current state invariant, guard condition and
operation precondition do not result in an inconsistency.
\begin{theorem}{transitionPreconditionsok}
\exists className \spot t.current.invariant \land t.guard
\land t.actionPrecondition
\end{theorem}

prove by reduce;

Constraint 19 The Invariant of the Next State Must be Implied by the Transition's
Guard and the Postcondition of the Action
This rule is implemented by declaration of a theorem that conjuncts the transition
guard and action postcondition and implies the next state invariant. The syntax for
a Z/Eves theorem to ensure this constraint is given below.

\begin{theorem}{transitionImpliesNextStateIsOk}
\exists className \spot t.guard \land t.action.post
\implies t.next.inv
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\end{theorem}

prove by reduce;

Constraint 20 The Invariant of the Send Events of a Transition Must Be Implied
By the Transition's Guard and the Postcondition of the Action
The following theorem is generated to test the constraint that send event invariants
of a transition are implied by the guard condition and action postcondition.

\begin{theorem}{transitionImpliesSendEventsIsOk}
\exists className \spot t.guard \land t.action.post
\implies send_l.inv \land send_2.inv \land ...
\end{theorem}

prove by reduce;

Constraint 21 The Precondition of an Action Must be Implied by the Conditions
of the Transition.
\begin{theorem}{transitionImpliesSendEventsIsOk}
\exists className \spot (t.guard \land t.current.inv
\land t.receive.inv) \implies t.action.pre
\end{theorem}

prove by reduce;

Constraint 22 Receive Event Parameters Must Match Action Input Parameters
This rule would be best enforced by a semantic analysis visitor and is not verified
by the products of this research.
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Constraint 23 Send Event Parameters Must Match Action OutputParameters
As with Constraint 22, this constraint is best enforced by a semantic analysis visitor
and is therefore not verified by the products of this research.

4.IS Domain Level Structural Verification
Constraint 24 Associations Must Refer to Classes Defined Within the Domain
The only verification relating to associations, associative objects and explicitly defined aggregations (as opposed to those declared as variables of the aggregate class)
is provided by the linking visitor.
This research has, however, led to the generation of association Schemas for
the Z specification model even though they are not further referenced in any proofs
of this research. The multiplicity of each end role is a declared integer type. The
multiplicities proposed by Buckwalter for the generation of the associative schema
are:
1. Optional—representing the cardinality zero or one,
2. ZeroOrMore—self explanatory, and
3. OneOrMore.
For example, there exists an association named flies between an instance of type
pilot and an instance of type aircraft. The AWL specification and its corresponding
Z representation are depicted in Figure 33.
Note that this method of transformation of associations is unsuitable for specifying associations that are of a higher degree than binary.
Constraint 25 Associative Objects Must Refer to Classes Within the Domain
As with Constraint 24, this check is performed by both Z/Eves and the linker.
Constraint 26 Aggregation Must Refer to Classes Within the Domain
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association flies is
role aviator : pilot multiplicity Optional;
role ride : aircraft multiplicity ZeroOrMore;
end association;

[pilot]
[aircraft]

Pilots = P pilot

AIRCRAFT = P aircraft
.flies
a : pilot <-*■ aircraft
Va; G doma#(x < a) < 1
Vy e rana#(?/> a) > 0

Figure 33.

AWL and Z Representation of the Association Flies
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A specific form of association, aggregation is verified via the linker and by Z/Eves.

4-14

Domain Level Functional Verification
Both Z/Eves and the semantic analysis visitor are used to determine errors in

the functional portion of the analysis model. Dynamic Schemas identify the class
they modify in the schema signature.

The Z specification visitor adds the class

identifier to the schema based upon which class the method is declared over and as
such, the method is identified as being an operation of that particular class and is
only capable of modifying the class' constituent attributes.
Constraint 27 Operation Calls Must Match Signatures
Operation signature verification is outside the scope of the current Z specification visitor. The compatibility of operation signatures and operation calls could be verified
by the semantic analysis visitor.

4-15

Domain Level Dynamic Verification

Constraint 28 Objects May Only Communicate Via Send and Receive Events
The linker enforces this rule. The linker does not allow for classes to directly invoke
operations of other classes nor does it allow transitions to be dependent upon events
not declared within the class.
Constraint 29 All States Should be Reachable
By prepending the keyword progress to the name of a state in the Promela file, Spin
will monitor the state during execution and provide notice of failure to transition
to it if the state is never visited. Spin has two modes of operation—in the first it
performs random simulations while the second is an exhaustive verification of the
entire state space. It is this second mode that must be used to verify this rule.
Spin's exhaustive search method is effective for approximately 100,000 states [Spin]
and should therefore remain applicable for the majority of systems being modeled.
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Figure 34 provides an example of the output generated from running a random
simulation of the system. The command line for such an execution is: spinSSP -c
-a cruiseMissik.prm. The arguments -c and -« tell Spin how to configure its output
and to create an analysis model in the programming language C. The first portion
of the output in Figure 34 identifies the process number of each class in the dynamic
model. The second portion shows the sending and receiving of events between the
classes. The final portion of the output identifies the final state of each class at the
end of execution.
It should be noted that simulation of the entire state space requires the compilation and execution of the generated C analysis model. Output of Spin's evaluation
of the entire state space is shown in Figure 35.
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Figure 35 contains the output of an exhaustive analysis of an erroneous version
of the cruise missile model. The output identifies the unreachable states of the model
and messages not sent or received. The command line instruction to compile the
analysis model is cc -DBITSTATE -o run pan.c where -DBITSTATE is a directive
for the compiler to compiler the code such that it maximizes memory efficiency
during execution. The command line instruction to execute the exhaustive state
space analysis is run -c > out.txt where -c is the output format and out.txt is the
file for the resultant output to be piped to.

4.16

Verifying the Dynamic Model With Spin
After generation of the Promela model, the only thing to be added to the file

is a statement that enables Spin to run the specification. The statement instructs
Spin to run each of the defined dynamic models and has the following syntax:

init
{

atomic
{
run missileFuelTankO ;
run navigationSystemO ;
run guidanceSystemO;
run flightDirectorO;
run airframeO ;
run cruiseMissileQ

}
}
Execution of the Promela model will then verify constraints regarding state
reachability and identify states and events not executed during the simulation.
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proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
proc
q\p
7
7
8
8
4
4
2
2

0 = :init:
1 = missileFuelTank
2 = navigationSystem
3 = flightProfile
4 = guidanceSystem
5 = flightDirector
6 = avionicsSoftware
7 = warhead
8 = airframe
9 = throttle
10 = jetEngine
11 = propulsionSystem
12 = cruiseMissile
0
1
2
3
4
5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12
map25!initPropulsionSystem
map25?initPropulsionSystem
map23!initThrottle
map23?initThrottle
map24!initEngine
map24?initEngine
map21!initAirframe
map21?initAirframe

timeout
final state:
#processes: 13
24:
proc 12 (cruiseMissile) line 260 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 6)
24:
proc 11 (propulsionSystem) line 245 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 6)
24:
proc 10 (jetEngine) line 235 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 10)
24:
proc 9 (throttle) line 221 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 11)
24:
proc 8 (airframe) line 189 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 11)
24:
proc 7 (warhead) line 165 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 6)
24:
proc 6 (avionicsSoftware) line 150 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 9)
24:
proc 5 (flightDirector) line 130 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 6)
24:
proc 4 (guidanceSystem) line 103 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 6)
24:
proc 3 (flightProfile) line 88 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 6)
24:
proc 2 (navigationSystem) line 69 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 6)
24:
proc 1 (missileFuelTank) line 44 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 6)
24:
proc 0 (:init:) line 289 "cruiseMissile.prm" (state 14) <valid endstate>
13 processes created
Figure 34.

SPIN Test Run Using: spin399 -s -c -a cruiseMissile.prm
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pan: invalid endstate (at depth 25)
(Spin Version 3.3.9 ~ 31 January 2000)
+ Partial Order Reduction
Full statespace search for:
never-claim
- (none specified)
assertion violations
+
acceptance
cycles
- (not selected)
invalid endstates
+
State-vector 208 byte, depth reached 26, errors: 1
17 states, stored
2 states, matched
19 transitions (= stored+matched)
11 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
(max size 2~18 states)
1.493

memory usage (Mbyte)

unreached in
line 46,
line 50,
line 56,
line 55,
line 61,
line 62,
line 62,
line 60,
line 60,
(8 of 33
unreached in
line 71,
line 76,
line 75,
line 81,

proctype missileFuelTank
state 3, "(1)"
state 11, "(1)"
state 15, "(1)"
state 18, "mapl?changeTankFlow"
state 22, "(1)"
state 26, "(1)"
state 28, "map3!outOfFuel"
state 30, "mapl?changeTankFlow"
state 30, "map2?tankEmpty"
states)
proctype navigationSystem
state 3, "(1)"
state 10, "(1)"
state 13, "map5?updatePosition"
state 17, "(1)"

line 81, state 19, "map6lestimatePosition"
line 80, state 21, "(1)"
(6 of 24 states)
Figure 35.

Results of Exhaustive State Space Reachability Test
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unreached in proctype flightProfile
line 90, state 3, "(1)"
line 95, state 10, "(1)"
line 96, state 14, "(1)"
line 94, state 17, umap9?addWayPoint"
line 94, state 17, "maplO?removeFirstWayPoint"
(4 of 20 states)
unreached in proctype guidanceSystem
line 105, state 3, "(1)"
line 110, state 10, "(1)"
line 110, state 12, "map5!updatePosition"
line 111, state 15, "(1)"
line 112, state 19, "(1)"
line 112, state 21, "map5lupdatePosition"
line 109, state 23, "mapl2?doLaunch"
line 109, state 23, "map6?estimatePosition"
line 109, state 23, "map4?out0fFuel"
line 117, state 28, "maplOIremoveFirstWayPoint"
line 117, state 29, "mapl3!armMissile"
line 116, state 34, "(1)"
line 116, state 34, "(1)"
line 122, state 38, "goto :bl2"
line 125, state 41, "-end-"
(12 of 41 states)
unreached in proctype flightDirector
line 132, state 3, "(1)"
line 137, state 10, "(1)"
line 137, state 12, "mapl7!changeCourse"
line 137, state 13, "mapl8!setElevation"
line 137, state 14, "mapl9!setThrottle"
line 136, state 16, "mapl5?errorSignals"
line 143, state 20, "(1)"
line 142, state 23, "mapl6?maneuverComplete"
(8 of 26 states)
unreached in proctype avionicsSoftware
line 152, state 3, "(l)"

line 152, state 5, "map4!initNavigationSystem"
line 152, state 6, "mapll!initGuidanceSystem"
line 153, state 7, "mapl5!initFlightDirector"
line 157, state 13, "goto :bl7"
line 160, state 16, "-end-"
(6 of 16 states)
Figure 35.

Results of Exhaustive State Space Reachability Test Cont.
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unreached in proctype warhead
line 167, state 3, "(1)"
line 172, state 10, "(1)"
line 171, state 13, "mapl3?arinMissile"
line 176, state 17, "goto :b20"
line 179, state 20, "-end-"
(5 of 20 states)
unreached in proctype airframe
line 191, state 9, "(1)"
line 196, state 15, "(1)"
line 197, state 18, "(1)"
line 198, state 21, "(1)"
line 195, state 23, "map3?out0fFuel"
line 195, state 23, "map6?estimatePosition"
line 195, state 23, "mapl7?changeCourse"
line 203, state 27, "(1)"
line 204, state 30, "(1)"
line 202, state 32, "map22?doManeuverComplete"
line 202, state 32, "map3?out0fFuel"
line 208, state 36, "goto :b25"
line 211, state 39, "-end-"
(10 of 39 states)
unreached in proctype throttle
line 223, state 9, "map28!changeTankFlow"
(1 of 14 states)
unreached in proctype jetEngine
(0 of 13 states)
unreached in proctype propulsionSystem
line 251, state 12, "goto :b31"
line 254, state 15, "-end-"
(2 of 15 states)
unreached in proctype cruiseMissile
line 262, state 7, "map28!initAvionicsSoftware"
line 267, state 13, "(1)"
line 267, state 14, "mapl2IdoLaunch"
line 266, state 16, "map27?launch"
line 271, state 20, "goto :b34"
line 274, state 23, "-end-"
(6 of 23 states)
unreached in proctype :init:
(0 of 14 states)
Figure 35.

Results of Exhaustive State Space Reachability Test Cont.
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It should be noted that Promela's lack of expressive power in discrete arithmetic made the transformation of some expressions impossible and thus resulted in a
lack of representation of many propositions in the simulation model. This effectively
means that the reachability analysis performed, although insightful, is inadequate
for testing the state reachability of OMT dynamic models.

4-17

Summary
This chapter details the implementation of the constraints proposed in Chapter

Three—how they are specified and how they are verified. The analysis model visitors
designed to produce Z/Eves and Promela models of the specification are described as
is how these theorem proving/dynamic model verifying tools ensure the consistency,
completeness, and correctness of a domain model.
The final chapter of this document evaluates the constraints and implementation of this research before drawing conclusions and proposing directions for future,
related work.
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V. Results
5.1

Introduction
This chapter details the results of testing and execution of the methodology

proposed and implemented in Chapters Three and Four. Testing of the practicality,
testability, and effectiveness of the constraints proposed was evaluated by their application to an object-oriented formal specification and analysis of the outcomes of
the verification process.
The initial analysis model to which these constraints were applied was developed as part of this research effort and is presented at Appendix B. The majority
of faults in the analysis model were introduced with the intent purpose of ensuring
the implementation of the system while others were simply accidental errors of the
specification.
5.2 Implementation Coverage
Table 2 summarizes the state of each constraint, i.e., whether or not verification
of the constraint is implemented and whether that implementation is automated.
The verification of the majority of the constraints implemented is automatic (once
the tools are in execution).
Feedback provided to the user takes the form of the output provided by the
tools Z/Eves and Spin and as such, the value of the feedback is limited by the user's
experience with the tools.
Automation of the remaining constraints and the provision of feedback in a
manner that is specific to 00 but not the tools in particular would provide the ability
to apply these tools without the requisite knowledge of their internal execution.
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5.3

Evaluation of the Constraints
Chapter Three introduced constraints for the three models of OMT. These

constraints help to provide and verify formal semantics to the semi-formal foundation
of OMT. The list of constraints is by no means complete—Section 5.6 proposes future
work in the formalization of aggregation and inheritance alone. They do, however,
provide a solid foundation to the concepts required to formalize and verify OOA
models and prove that verification is in fact suited to semi-automation.
Other than the identified weaknesses in formalism of the inheritance and aggregation constraints, the question that begs to be answered is "Are the constraints
proposed complete?". Unfortunately, the answer is not as simple as the question and
should be subdivided into the following sections:
1. Is the list of constraints exhaustive?
2. Is the list of constraints fully implemented?
3. Is each constraint complete?
5.3.1

Is the List of Constraints Exhaustive 9

The constraints were identified

via analysis of the six perspectives of an OMT analysis model as described in Chapter
Three. For each perspective, it was attempted to identify the key constituents of the
model and ensure that they were formally constrained to assist in verification of the
correctness of the entire model.
It has already been acknowledged that this list of constraints is incomplete.
Just how to go about proving that a list of constraints is complete is an extremely
complex if not fruitless task.
5.3.2

Is the List of Constraints Fully Implemented?

Not all of the con-

straints proposed are checked. The constraints not implemented are identified as
such in Table 2. The failure to implement and/or automate those constraints is due
to:
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1. Z/Eves representing schema invariants as ticked variables only (instead of both
ticked and unticked). This leads to the inability of proofs to identify all instances of non-conformity with Constraints 3, 5, 18, 19, 20, and 21.

The

simplest rectification appears to be the explicit inclusion of the unticked state
invariant into each proposition as required.
2. Promela's inadequate variety of data types and subsequent lack of expressive
power when dealing with discrete arithmetic. Promela's list of data types is
limited to bit, byte, short and int. These data types represent signed and
unsigned integer values of differing ranges. The lack of support for sets, sequences and propositions is sorely felt. This meant that verification using Spin
was little more than verification of state reachability based solely upon class
communication with no regard for guard conditions or class attribute manipulation.
3. Deferral of implementation to a semantic analyzer. Constraints 22 and 23
deal with operation parameter matching—something more suited to a semantic
analyzer than a theorem prover.
4. Difficulty in expressing the required theorems. Constraints 6 and 7 deal with
the relationship between a subclass class' invariant and its parent's invariant.
The theorem proposed simply substituted true for the parent's invariant because Z/Eves believed that as a schema declaration, the schema predicate must
be true and thus simplified it as such. A better theorem would extract the superclass invariant and conduct the proof based solely upon it rather than the
superclass schema.
Although the aforementioned constraints are not fully functional, these problems could possibly be addressed by other verification tools as they are not all that
more complex than any of the other constraints proposed. In fact, all but one of
these constraints (Constraint 29) could possibly be addressed by the theorem prover
(requiring more complex transforms) and a semantic analyzer. It should also be
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mentioned that the most surprising error detection was that what was thought to
be a robust dynamic model did, in fact, have numerous unreachable states.
5.3.3 Is Each Constraint Complete?

The theorems implemented in Z/Eves

are based closely upon the formalisms provided in Chapter Three and are therefore
likely to be complete with respect to the proposed constraints. Verification of the
dynamic model is trivialized somewhat and as such, is obviously incomplete.

5.4

Research Findings
The majority of constraints proposed as part of this research were capable

of being expressed and tested without the requirement for user interaction. The
automation of much of the formal specification process and subsequent verification
simplifies the somewhat overwhelming task and increases the value of formal methods
in software engineering.
The results of this research are promising. The constraints determined in
Chapter Three identify model attributes that must be verified in order to determine
system correctness. The constraints also assist in the definition of OOA semantics for
the purposes of automated verification. The implementation proves that the model
may be transformed so as to provide the input to commercially available verification
tools.
5.5

Conclusion
Automated validation and verification of object-oriented analysis models pro-

vides the software engineer with an effective and efficient manner in which to remove
a great deal of the effort involved in the use of formal methods. The importance of
V&V to correctness-preserving transformations systems cannot be stressed enough.
This research provides a framework of constraints that when applied to an OOA
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system, help verify model correctness at the dynamic, functional, and structural
levels.
This research suggests that the initial cost to construct an automated verification suite is worth the effort required due to the increased effectiveness and efficiency
it offers to V&V of 00A models. Keeping in mind that the majority of automated
tools are only effective for the system they are designed to be used in conjunction
with, this research also indicates that implementation and use of such a verification
suite is practical and valuable. For the test cases of this research, the theorems generated were relatively easy to prove with a currently available theorem prover—thus
providing evidence of the applicability of the proposed verification techniques.
However, it must be stated that the decision as to whether a purpose built
V&V suite should be used or a COTS system employed is of critical importance.
Therefore, a needs analysis that identifies the constraints to be verified should be
conducted prior to the selection of any verification tool.

5.6

Future Directions
A number of avenues for future work based upon this research exist
5.6.1

Further Formalism of Inheritance Towards Strict Inheritance.

Con-

straints 6 and 7 deal with subclass consistency and substitutability for the superclass
invariant. Strict inheritance requires a subclass to maintain the structural, functional
and dynamic properties of the superclass so that the child class is substitutable for
the parent. This notion is also termed extension—the "two systems are indistinguishable if we cannot tell them apart without pulling them apart" [Milner].
The requirements of substitutability exceed the constraints implemented in this
research. Constraints 6 and 7 only ensure correctness of the subclass invariant. The
expressions of a subclass, be they pre- or postconditions, event or state invariants,
or guard conditions must not further constrain the attributes inherited from the
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superclass. The functionality of operations must not be changed. Newly introduced
operators are free to form any expression that does not violate any of the Constraints
proposed in Chapter Three.
5.6.2

Further Verification of Aggregate Dynamic Models.

System level

dynamic model verification should include checking the domain dynamic model for
the possibilities of starvation, deadlock, unreachable states, and correct termination.
Constraint 29, all states must be reachable, is the only complex formal constraint of
domain level dynamic models in this research.
Deadlock occurs when two (or more) classes are waiting for each other to send
an event. Although complex to detect, the comprehensive output generated by Spin
identifies which classes are waiting upon what events when simulation execution
halts—thus identifying where the breakdown in model correctness occurs. Starvation, where a class cannot change state due to a lack of a certain resource, may also
be determined in this fashion.
Specific behavior of a domain may be simulated by the injection of messages
into the init portion of the Promela specification to ascertain if certain initial conditions lead to unreachable states, deadlock, or starvation. The creation of use case
test sets to ensure desired behavior of the specified system would assist in validation
of system behavior. It is possible in SPIN to introduce a set of events into and
execute a dynamic model—the result of such could be compared to the expected
behavior of the system.
5.6.3

Event Mapping in Promela.

Work was started in the modeling of

event maps. The prototype Promela generation visitor maps events according to
their name via channel declarations. These mappings are therefore solely based upon
event name matching. A more robust form of event mapping could be implemented
by declaring a channel for each event map. This would allow for the passing of events
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to specific classes rather than their broadcast to all classes that have the matching
receive event in their dynamic models.
5.6.4

Representation of Reals and Literal Strings in Z.

The representation

of string values was less than adequate in this research. One possible solution would
be the use of an enumerated type (such as char) that declared the permissible values
that an element of a string could take and the subsequent declaration of the type
string such that it was a power set of sequences of char. This concept is illustrated
in figure 36
char::=a\b\c\d..A\B\C.. 1 | 2 .. | 0 ...

I

string : P(seqchar)
Figure 36.

Declaration of a Literal String Type

The modeling of real numbers in Z is far more difficult to achieve than the
modeling of literal strings. The constraints proposed in Chapter Three do not require differentiation between real types and integer types. Thus, the Z specification
represents fixed and floating point real numbers as integers.
One limitation of the approach taken in this research is that the literal value is
simply cast as an integer and therefore loses a great deal of its value. Multiplication
of the value by its decimal place resolution (as done with the bounds of the type)
would result in a more accurate representation.
More work is required in the specification of what it is that should be enforced
when dealing with real types and these rules would become part of the semantic
analyzer toolkit.
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Appendix A. A FIT Wide Spectrum Object Modeling Environment
and Language
The aim of this appendix is to provide a brief introduction to the history and development of the AFIT Wide Spectrum Object Modeling Environment (AWSOME),
a description of the AWSOME metamodel, and finally, to provide the production
rules upon which the language is developed. The productions are provided in order
to explicitly define the required structure of any AWSOME analysis model created
without making use of the language and parser but wishing to use the verification
tools provided as part of this research.

A. I

Introduction
AWSOME is the culmination of the extension and redesign of AFITtool, a

correctness-preserving formal software synthesis system developed by students and
faculty at the United States Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). The aim of
AFITtool was to provide for proof of concept of much of the software engineering
related research being conducted at AFIT. This tool was implemented in Reasoning's
high level language Refine over a period of six years.
Being a wide-spectrum environment, AWSOME is capable of modeling objectoriented systems at various stages of the software development cycle. AWSOME
is capable of specification level modeling where much of the system is specified in
terms of formal expressions, for example, methods are specified in terms of preand postconditions, while classes, their states and events are defined over invariant
expressions.
Elements specified in AWSOME may be reused extensively via the facilitation
of an object-oriented repository that allows for the harvesting of pre-defined classes
to be added to the problem domain currently being specified/analyzed.
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Via the use of correctness-preserving semi-autonomous transforms, the analysislevel model may be transformed into a design-level representation. Transformations
exist to take the analysis model to the design level as follows:
1. associations are replaced with single and bi-directional access types,
2. associative objects are transformed into to classes,
3. dynamic models are replaced class methods,
4. class invariants become statements of class methods, and
5. method pre- and postconditions are expressed as statements within the method
body.
Another series of transformations leads from the design model to executable
code. AFITtool is capable of generating Ada code, however, in order to make AWSOME more widely applicable, not only was it implemented in Java, but the output
language of choice was also selected to be Java. Some work has been accomplished
dealing with the generation of C++ from AWSOME models as well, however, this
capability is not as extensive as its Java counterpart.

A. 2

The AWSOME Metamodel
This section describes the metamodel that forms the template for analysis

models represented by AWSOME ASTs. Following the lines of object-oriented analysis, the AWSOME metamodel structure will be described from the perspective
of inheritance and aggregation. Approximately 100 classes exist in the AWSOME
metamodel.
A.2.1

AWSOME AST Class Naming.

Wsldentifier facilitates the naming

of Ws classes. WsIdentifierRef provides the capability to refer to instances of Wsldentifier. The linking phase of AWSOME AST generation provides each instance of
WsIdentifierRef with a pointer to its corresponding Wsldentifier.
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A.2.2

The Inheritance Model.

The root of AWSOME's inheritance hierar-

chy is the abstract class WsObject. The immediate children of WsObject that are of
importance to analysis models and interesting to address further are WsDeclaration,
WsExpression, WsDynamicModel, WsAttribute, and WsMethod.
A.2.2.1

WsDeclaration.

From WsDeclaration spawn the subclasses

for representing data types, variables, constants, states, events, sets, sequences, bags,
functions, procedures, and associations. Essentially, from WsDeclaration is inherited
attributes and methods related to AST node identification.
A.2.2.2

WsExpression.

It is the subclasses of WsExpression that

define the structure of expressions contained within an analysis model abstract syntax tree (AST). The WsExpression family of objects deals with the representation
of identification references (via WsName and its subclasses), proposition quantification, and binary and unary expressions. It is expected that the binary and unary
expression portion of the tree will be extended in order to provide a greater degree
of expression functionality to sets and encompass sequence and bag operators.
A.2.2.3

WsAttribute.

WsAttribute defines the AWSOME model for

representation of class attributes. It is a direct subclass of WsObject and extends
it by the addition of attributes describing certain characteristics of a class attribute
such as whether it is private or public and by providing database query information
[Buckwalter]. A WsAttribute has a WsDataObject as an aggregate component—it
this data object that the characteristics of WsAttribute define.
A.2.2.4

WsMethod.

Similar to WsAttribute, WsMethod provides

attributes to another Ws class. WsMethod defines the visibility of a class method—
a private method is only visible within the scope of the class while a public method
may be invoked by other classes of the domain. The method pre- and postconditions
are described by an aggregate component of WsMethod— WsSubprogram. It should
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be noted that although public methods may be invoked by other classes, object
communication within this research is conducted solely by event passing.
A.2.3

The Aggregation Model.

The root node of any AWSOME analysis

model is the artifact (don't ask me why—I don't really know). An artifact comprises of one or more packages that form containers for related domain elements.
Each package consists of a set of declarations that may be used to declare classes,
associations, associative objects, type definitions, constant declarations, and other
packages. Figure 37 illustrates the aggregation diagram of the WsClass. At this
point it is worth noting that every class of the AWESOME metamodel is prepended
with Ws which identifies the class as an AWSOME metamodel component.
A.2.3.1

WsClass.

It can be seen in Figure 37 that a WsClass consists

of a set of attributes, a set of methods (WsMethod), a dynamic model (WsDynamicModel), an invariant expression (WsExpression), an event map set (WsEvent), and
a pointer (WsIdentifierRef) to the class' parent class (if, in fact, there is one).
A.2.3.2

WsDynamicModel

AWSOME dynamic models are con-

structed from the aggregation of a set each of events (WsEvent), transitions (WsTransition) and states (WsState). The set of states exhaustively defines the state space
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of a class, the set of events exhaustively defines the send and receive events by which
the class communicates with other classes of the domain. Events may contain parameters that allow classes to pass arguments for use in transition actions. Figure
38 illustrates the WsDynamicModel structural diagram.
A.2.3.S

WsTransition.

Each transition of a dynamic model is de-

scribed by an instance of the aggregate class WsTransition. This class defines the
event and guard condition precipitating the transition (WsExpression), the action
(method invocation) that takes place and any events sent as a product of the transition between states. It should be noted for a given transition that parameters of
the receive event must map to the in parameters of the action and that parameters
of the send events must map to the out parameters of the action. Figure 39 depicts
the WsTransition structural model.

A.3 AWL Syntax
This section provides production rules of the grammar that dictate the AWSOME language (AWL) syntax. The AWL parser is implemented with the parser
design tool JavaCC that provides the ability to define a grammar and generate a
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compilable Java implementation of the parser. To provide the level of functionality
required within the AWL parser, augmentation of the JavaCC file with Java code
was required. Except for <ID>, which represents an identification string, terms
embedded within <> are keywords.
compilation unit

Package <E0F>

package :: <PACKAGE> Identifier <IS> ( Declaration I Package)*
<END> <PACKAGE> ";"
Declaration :: TypeDeclaration I Subprogram I DataObject I Association
Identifier ::

t = <ID>

TypeDeclaration :: <TYPE> Identifier <IS> TypeDefinition
TypeDefinition :: AbstractTypeDefinition
I
ArrayTypeDefinition
I
AccessTypeDefinition
I
BagTypeDefinition
I
DerivedTypeDefinition
I
EnumerationTypeDefinition
I
IntegerTypeDefinition
I
RealTypeDefinition
I
RecordTypeDefinition
I
SequenceTypeDefinition
I
SetTypeDefinition
I
UnionTypeDefinition
AbstractTypeDefinition :: <ABSTRACT> ";"
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I Class

AccessTypeDefinition :: <ACCESS> TypeName ";"
ArrayTypeDefinition :: <ARRAY> "[" TypeName "]" <0F> TypeName ";"
BagTypeDefinition :: <BAG> <0F> TypeName ";"
DerivedTypeDefinition :: IdentifierRef <WHERE> Expression ";"
EnumerationTypeDefinition :: "(" EnumerationValue( "," EnumerationValue)*
II \ II

EnumerationValue ::

II . II

Identifier

IntegerTypeDefinition :: <RANGE> ( "*" I Expression) ".."
( "*" | Expression) ";"
RealTypeDefinition :: (<DELTA> Expression I <DIGITS> Expression
[ <BASE> Expression]) <RANGE> ( "*" I Expression) ".."
( "*" | Expression) ";"
RecordTypeDefinition :: <REC0RD> ( UninitializedVariable )+ <END> <REC0RD> ";"
SequenceTypeDefinition :: <SEQUENCE> <0F> TypeName ";"
SetTypeDefinition :: <SET> <0F> TypeName ";"
UnionTypeDefinition :: <UNI0N> ( UninitializedVariable)* <END> <UNI0N> ";"
Class :: <CLASS> Identifier <IS>
[<ABSTRACT>]
[TypeName <WITH>]
(visibilityPrefix ( Attribute I Method))*
[ <INVARIANT> Expression]
[ DynamicModel ]
<END> <CLASS> ";"
visibilityPrefix :: <PRIVATE> I

<PUBLIC>

Attribute :: DataObject
Method :: [ <ABSTRACT>][ <CLASS>]
DynamicModel :: <DYNAMIC> <M0DEL> <IS>
( Event)*
( State)*
<TRANSITION> <TABLE> <IS>
( Transition)*
<END> <TRANSITION> <TABLE> ";"
<END> <DYNAMIC> <M0DEL> ";"
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Transition :: <IN> IdentifierRef
<0N> IdentifierRef
[ <IF> Expression]
[ <D0> SubprogramName]
[ <SEND> IdentifierRef ( "," IdentifierRef)* ]
<T0> IdentifierRef";"
State :: <STATE> Identifier [ <INVARIANT> Expression 3 ";"
Event :: <EVENT> Identifier "("[ Parameter ( ",*' Parameter)* ] ")"
[ <ASSUMES> Expression ]";"
Subprogram :: Procedure I Function
Procedure
[
[
[

:: <PROCEDURE> Identifier "("[Parameter ( "," Parameter) * ] ")"
<ASSUMES> Expression]
<GUARANTEES> Expression]
<IS> ( DataObject)* <BEGIN> (Statement)* <END> ";" ]

Function :: <FUNCTI0N> Identifier "("[ Parameter ( "," Parameter ) * ] ")"
":" TypeName
[ <ASSUMES> Expression]
[ <GUARANTEES> Expression]
[ <IS> ( DataObject)* <BEGIN> ( Statement)* <END> ";" ]
Association :: RegularAssociation I Aggregation I AssociativeObject
RegularAssociation : : <ASS0CIATI0N> Identifier <IS>AssociationEnd
( AssociationEnd )+
[ <INVARIANT> Expression ]
<END> <ASS0CIATI0N> ";"
AssociationEnd :: <R0LE> Identifier ":" TypeName <MULTIPLICITY> TypeName
( "," TypeName )* ";"
Aggregation : : <AGGREGATION> Identifier <IS>
ParentEnd
ChildEnd
[ <INVARIANT> Expression ] <END> <AGGREGATION> ";"
ParentEnd :: <PARENT> Identifier ":" TypeName <MULTIPLICITY> TypeName
( "," TypeName)* ";"
ChildEnd :: <CHILD> Identifier ":" TypeName <MULTIPLICITY> TypeName
( "," TypeName)* ";"
AssociativeObject :: <ASSOCIATIVEOBJECT> Identifier <IS>
AssociationObjEnd (AssociationObjEnd)+
( visibilityPrefix ( Attribute I Method))*
[ <INVARIANT> Expression ]
<END> <ASSOCIATIVEOBJECT> ";"
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AssociationObjEnd :: <R0LE> Identifier ":" TypeName <MULTIPLICITY> TypeName
( "," TypeName)* [ <QUALIFIED> <BY> IdentifierRef]";"
Expression :: OrExpression ( "=>" DrExpression )*
ExpList :: [ Expression ( "," Expression)* ]
OrExpression :: AndExpression ( <0R> AndExpression)*
AndExpression :: RelationalExpression ( <AND> RelationalExpression )*
RelationalExpression :: AddExpression ["="
"/=" AddExpression
"<" AddExpression
"<=" AddExpression
">" AddExpression
">=" AddExpression
<IN>
AddExpression
<SUBSET>
AddExpression
<SUBSETEQ> AddExpression ]

AddExpression

AddExpression :: MultiplyExpression ("+" MultiplyExpression
I "-" MultiplyExpression)*
MultiplyExpression :: ExponentExpression
("*"
ExponentExpression
I "/"
ExponentExpression
I <M0D> ExponentExpression
I <INTERSECT> ExponentExpression
j <UNI0N> ExponentExpression)*
ExponentExpression :: UnaryExpression ("**" ExponentExpression)*
UnaryExpression :: PrimaryExpression
I
<N0T> UnaryExpression
|
"-"
UnaryExpression
|
"+"
UnaryExpression
PrimaryExpression ::
AccessExpression
I
Allocator
I
LOOKAHEAD ( ("{*" I "[" I "{" ) Expression "I") ContainerFormer
I
LOOKAHEAD (SubprogramName "(") FunctionCall
I
LiteralConstant
I
LOOKAHEAD (TypeName "'" "(") TypeConversion
I
Name
I
QuantifiedExpression
I
"(" Expression ")"
AccessExpression :: "&" Name
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Allocator :: <NEW> TypeName
ContainerFormer :: BagFormer
I SequenceFormer
I SetFormer
BagFormer :: "{*" Expression "I" LogicalVarList Expression "*}"
SequenceFormer :: "[" Expression "I" LogicalVarList Expression "]"
SetFormer :: "{" Expression "I" LogicalVarList Expression "}"
LogicalVariable :: Identifier ":" TypeName
LogicalVarList :: "(" [ LogicalVariable ( "," LogicalVariable )* ] ")'
FunctionCall :: SubprogramName "(" ExpList ")"
SubprogramName :: SimpleName
( ("[" Expression "]"
I
""" #Dereference
I
"'" #Tick )*
"." IdentifierRef)*
LiteralConstant ::
L it eralCharact er
I LiteralContainer
I Literallnteger
I LiteralNull
I LiteralReal
I LiteralString
LiteralCharacter :: t = <CHARACTER_LITERAL>
LiteralContainer :: LiteralBag
I LiteralSequence
I LiteralSet
LiteralBag ::

"{*" ExpList(listLen) "*}"

LiteralSequence :: "[" ExpList "]"
LiteralSet :: "{" ExpList(listLen) "}"
Literallnteger :: t = <INTEGER_LITERAL>
LiteralNull :: <NULL>
LiteralReal :: t = <REAL_LITERAL>
LiteralString :: t = <STRING_LITERAL>
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Name :: SimpleName ( NameSuffix )*
SimpleName :: IdentifierRef I This
IdentifierRGf :: t = <ID>
This :: <THIS>
NameSuffix :: "." IdentifierRef
I
"[" Expression "]"
I

ii -ii

|

„,,.

SelectedComponent :: SimpleName ( ("[" Expression "]"
I
II-II
|

»>»)*

"." IdentifierRef)+
TypeName :: IdentifierRef ( "." IdentifierRef )*
QuantifiedExpression :
ExistentialExpression
I
UniqueExpression
I
UniversalExpression
ExistentialExpression :: <EXISTS> LogicalVarList "(" Expression ")'
UniqueExpression :: <UNIQUE> LogicalVarList "(" Expression ")"
UniversalExpression :: <F0RALL> LogicalVarList "(" Expression ")"
TypeConversion :: TypeName '"" "(" Expression ")"
Statement :: LabeledStatement
I BasicStatement
LabeledStatement :: ( Label )+ BasicStatement
BasicStatement :: Name ":=" Assignment
I Iteration
I Jump
I ProcedureCall
I Selection
Label :: "«" Identifier "»"
Assignment :: Name ":=" Expression ";"
Jump :: <G0T0> IdentifierRef ";"
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Iteration :: <WHILE> Expression <D0> ( Statement )* <END> <D0> ";"
ProcedureCall :: SubprogramName "(" ExpList(listLen) ")" ";"
Selection :: <IF> Expression <THEN> ( Statement)*
[ <ELSE> ( Statement)* ]
<END> <IF> ";"
DataObject :: Identifier ":" DataObjectTail
DataObjectTail :: <C0NSTANT> TypeName [":=" Expression] ";"
I TypeName [":=" Expression] ";"
UninitializedVariable :: Identifier ":" TypeName ";"
Constant :: Identifier ":" TypeName [ ":=" Expression ] ";"
Parameter :: Identifier ":" (( <IN> [ <0UT> ] ) | <0UT> {out = true;} )
TypeName
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Appendix B. The Cruise Missile Problem Domain
B.l

Introduction
This appendix contains the test case used throughout this research. Contained

within this appendix is the AWL file that forms the object-oriented analysis model,
UML and Z representations of the analysis model, and samples of the generated
Z/Eves and Promela output files.

B.2

The UML Analysis Model
Although the specification is implemented in AWL, initial analysis made use

of UML, and as an aide to clarity, the UML version of the specification has been
reproduced here. It will become apparent that without augmentation with prose,
the UML model is not capable of fully specifying the analysis model as specified with
AWL.

B.3

The AWL Analysis Model
It will be noted that enumerated type values seem somewhat unwieldly—this
is due tothe fact that Z does not allow different enumerated types to have elements
with equal values, thus the class name has been appended to each state name.
package cruiseMissile is
/*
* This is a modified version of the cruise missile system modelled by
* Gates, Giselquist, and Landry in August of 1993.
This code forms
* the test case used as part of the research conducted for the Masters
* thesis "Validation and Verification of Formal Specifications in
* Object-Oriented Software Engineering.
*
* References to the simulation system and substates of the airframe
* have been removed
*
* - Thomson
*
*/
type char is abstract;
type time is abstract;
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type timer is abstract;
type string is sequence of char;
type heading is delta 0.01 range 0.0 .. 360.0;
// type position is delta 0.001 range 0.0 .. 1000.0;
type speed is delta 0.1 range 0.0 .. 2000.0;
type mass is delta 0.1 range 0.0 .. 9000.0;
type yield is delta 0.1 range 0.0 .. 20000.0;
type real is delta 0.0001 range 0.0 .. 13000.0;
type bigReal is delta 0.0001 range 0.0 .. 27000.0;
type coordinate is delta 0.001 range - 4000 .. 4000;
type cmStates is (startcruiseMissile, preLaunchcruiseMissile,
flyingcruiseMissile);
type afStates is (startairframe, preLaunchairframe,
poweredFlightairframe, maneuveringairframe, inertialFlightairframe);
type navStates is (startnav, waitnav, readSensorsnav);
type flightDirectorStates is (startflightDirector, idleflightDirector,
maneuveringflightDirector);
type guidanceStates is (startguidanceSystem.idleguidanceSystem,
processingguidanceSystem.terminalguidanceSystem);
type throttleStates is (startthrottle.idlethrottle);
type warheadArmed is (t,f);
type engineStates is (startengine, idleengine);
type realWeight is delta 0.01 range 0.0 .. 100.0;
pi : constant bigReal := 3.1414159;
class vector is
private x : coordinate;
private y : coordinate;
private z : coordinate;
private magnitude : bigReal;
end class;
class point is vector with
end class;
type flightPath is sequence of point;
class position is vector with
end class;
type route is sequence of position;
class velocity is vector with
end class;
class acceleration is vector with
end class;
class fuelTank is
private fuelLevel : bigReal;
private outputFlowRate : bigReal;
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private fuelDensity : bigReal;
end class;
class missileFuelTank is fuelTank with
private fixedWeight : realWeight;
private tankWeight : realWeight;
private capacity : bigReal;
private inputFlowRate : bigReal;
invariant fixedWeight = tankWeight + (fuelDensity * capacity / 2)
and inputFlowRate = 0
private procedure initializeMissileFuelTankO
guarantees fuelLevel' = capacity and outputFlowRate' = 0
private procedure changeFlow(actualFlowRate : in bigReal)
guarantees outputFlowRate' = actualFlowRate? and
fuelLevel' = fuelLevel and capacity' = capacity and
tankWeight' = tankWeight and fuelDensity' = fuelDensity
dynamic model is
event initMissileTankO;
event changeTankFlow();
event tankEmptyO;
state
state
state
state

start;
empty; //error - never invoked
full invariant fuelLevel = capacity and outputFlowRate = 0;
using invariant fuelLevel >= 0 and fuelLevel
<= capacity and outputFlowRate > 0;

transition table is
in start on initMissileTank if true do initializeMissileFuelTankO;
to full;
in full on changeTankFlow if true do changeFlowO; to using;
in using on changeTankFlow if true do changeflowO; to using;
in using on tankEmpty if true do changeFlowO; send outOfFuelO;
to empty;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class navigationSystem is
private navState : navStates;
dynamic model is
event initAirframe ();
event tankEmptyO ;
event getPositionO;
event changeCourseO;
event doManeuverCompleteO ;
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State start;
state wait;
state readSensors;
transition table is
in start on initNavigationSystem if true to wait;
in wait on updatePosition if true to readSensors;
in readSensors on AUTOMATIC if true send estimatePositionO ;
to wait;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class flightProfile is
private timeOnTarget : time;
private wayPoints : flightPath;
/* private procedure addPointToRoute(p : in point)
guarantees wayPoints' = cat(wayPoints,p)
private procedure removePointFromRouteO
guarantees wayPoints' = rest(wayPoints)
dynamic model is
event initFlightProfile();
event addWayPointO ;
event removeFirstWayPointO;
state start;
state idle;
transition table is
in start on initFlightProfile if true to idle;
in idle on addWayPoint if true do addPointToRouteO; to idle;
in idle on removeFirstWayPoint if true do
removePointFromRouteO; to idle;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class guidanceSystem is
private profile : flightProfile;
private wayPoints : flightPath;
private guidanceState : guidanceStates;
private chronometer : timer;
private procedure initializeGuidanceSystemO
private procedure output(relTime : in time, message : out string)
guarantees true /* message = "the cruise missile should reach the
target at " + char(relTime) */
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private procedure RemoveFirstRoutePointO
guarantees wayPoints' = rest(wayPoints)
dynamic model is
event initGuidanceSystemO;
event doLaunchO;
event estimatePositionO;
event outOfFuelO;
event armMissileO;
event updatePositionO ;
state
state
state
state

start;
idle;
processing;
terminal;

transition table is
in start on initGuidanceSystem if true to initializeGuidanceSystem;
in idle on doLaunch if true send updatePositionO; to idle;
in idle on estimatePosition if true to processing;
in idle on outOfFuel if true send updatePositionO; to terminal;
in processing on AUTOMATIC if profile.route'head =
profile.route'tail do removeFirstRoutePointO ; send armMissileO;
to terminal;
in processing on AUTOMATIC if not(profile.route'head =
profile.route'tail) to terminal;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class flightDirector is
private flightDirectorState : flightDirectorStates;
private procedure initializeO
guarantees flightDirectorState' = idleflightDirector
dynamic model is
event errorSignalsO;
event initFlightDirectorO;
event maneuverCompleteO;
state start invariant flightDirectorState = startflightDirector;
state idle invariant flightDirectorState = idleflightDirector;
state maneuvering invariant flightDirectorState =
maneuveringflightDirector;
transition table is
in start on initFlightDirector if true do
initializeFlightDirectorO; to idle;
in idle on errorSignals if true send changeCourseO ; setElevationO ;
setThrottleO; to maneuvering;

127

in maneuvering on maneuverComplete if true to idle;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class avionicsSoftware is
private navSys : navigationSystem;
private guidSys : guidanceSystem;
private director : flightDirector;
private procedure initializeAvionicsSoftwareO
dynamic model is
event initNavigationSystemO;
event initGuidanceSystemO;
event initFlightDirectorO;
event initAvionicsSoftwareO;
state start;
state avionicsSoftwarelnitialized;
transition table is
in start on initAvionicsSoftware if true do initializeAvionicsSoftwareO;
send initNavigationSystemO; to avionicsSoftwarelnitialized; //send
initGuidanceSystem send initFlightdirector
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class warhead is
private weight : mass;
private munitionType : string;
private explosiveForce : yield;
private armed : warheadArmed;
invariant weight > 0.0 and explosiveForce >= 0.0
private procedure initializeWarheadO
guarantees armed' = f
private procedure armWarheadO
guarantees armed' = t
dynamic model is
event initWarhead();
event armMissileO;
state start;
state unarmed invariant armed = f;
state armed invariant armed = t;
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transition table is
in start on AUTOMATIC if true do initializeWarheadO; to unarmed;
in unarmed on armMissile if true do armWarheadO; to armed;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class airframe is
private pos : position;
private accl : acceleration;
private vel : velocity;
private afState : afStates;
private heading : real;
private elevation : real;
invariant heading <= (2*pi) and heading >= 0.0 and elevation <= (pi/2)
and elevation >= (-pi/2)
private procedure initializeAirframeO
guarantees elevation' = (pi/2) and heading' = 0.0 and pos'.x = 0.0
and pos'.y =0.0 and pos'.z =0.0 and vel'.x =0.0
and vel'.y =0.0 and vel'.z =0.0 and accl'.x =0.0
and accl'.y = 0.0 and accl'.z =0.0
private procedure setPositionO is
dynamic model is
event initAirframe ();
event doLaunchO;
event tankEmptyO;
event estimatePositionQ ;
event changeCourseO ;
event maneuverComplete();
event outOfFuelO;
state
state
state
state
state

start invariant afState= startairframe;
preLaunch invariant afState = preLaunchairframe;
poweredFlight invariant afState = poweredFlightairframe;
maneuvering invariant afState = maneuveringairframe;
inertialFlight invariant afState = inertialFlightairframe;

transition table is
in initial on initAirframe if true to airframelnit;
in airframelnit on AUTOMATIC if true send initDoneO;
to poweredFlight;
in poweredFlight on tankEmpty if true to inertialFlight;
in poweredFlight on getPosition if true send positionCurrentO;
to poweredFlight;
in poweredFlight on changeCourse if true to maneuvering;
in maneuvering on doManeuverComplete if true to poweredFlight;
end transition table;
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end dynamic model;
end class;
class throttle is
private fuelFlow : real;
private throttleState : throttleStates;
private maximumFlowRate : real;
private actualFlowRate : real;
private procedure changeFuelFlowO
dynamic model is
event initThrottle();
event changeTankFlowO;
state start invariant throttleState = startthrottle;
state idle invariant throttleState = idlethrottle;
transition table is
in start on initThrottle if true to idle;
in idle on setThrottle do changeFuelFlowO ; send changeTankFlowOto idle;
'
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class jetEngine is
private thrust : real;
private maximumFuelFlowRate : real;
private currentFuelFlowRate : real;
private engineState : engineStates;
dynamic model is
event initEngineO;
event changeTankFlowO;
state start invariant engineState = startengine;
state idle invariant engineState = idleengine;
transition table is
in start on initEngine if true to idle;
in idle on changeTankFlow to idle;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class propulsionSystem is
private fuelFeed : throttle;
private engine : jetEngine;
private tank : missileFuelTank;
invariant (tank.fuelLevel = 0.0 => fuelFeed.maximumFlowRate =0.0)
and (tank.fuelLevel > 0.0 =>(fuelFeed.maximumFlowRate =
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engine.maximumFuelFlowRate)) and
(engine.currentFuelFlowRate = fuelFeed.actualFlowRate)
dynamic model is
event initPropulsionSystemO;
event initThrottleO;
event initEngineO ;
event initMissileFuelTankO ;
state start;
state idle;
transition table is
in start on initPropulsionSystem if true send initThrottleO;
to idle; //send initEngineO send missileFuelTankO;
in preLaunch on launch if true send doLaunchO; to flight;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
end class;
class cruiseMissile is
private propulsion : propulsionSystem;
private frame : airframe;
private payload : warhead;
private avionics : avionicsSoftware;
private cmState : cmStates;
/* functional model */
private procedure initializeCruiseMissileO
guarantees cmState' = preLaunchcruiseMissile
dynamic model is
event launch ();
event outOfFuelO;
event courseUpdateO;
event maneuverCompleteO ;
event doInitO;
event initDoneO;
event intiAirframeO ;
state start invariant cmState = startcruiseMissile;
state preLaunch invariant cmState = preLaunchcruiseMissile;
state flying invariant cmState = flyingcruiseMissile;
transition table is
in start on AUTOMATIC if true do initializeCruiseMissileO; send
initPropulsionSystemO; to preLaunch; //send initAirframeO
send initWarheadO send initAvionicsSoftwareO;
in preLaunch on launch if true send doLaunchO; to flight;
end transition table;
end dynamic model;
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end class;
end package;
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Appendix C. Z/Eves Specification of Cruise Missile
[char]

[t ime\

[ti mer\

string : P(seqchar)

heading : P Z
Vx : heading • x > 0
Vx : heading • x < 360

speed : P Z
V x : speed • x > 0
Vz : speed »x < 2000

mass : PZ
Vx : mass • x > 0
Vx : mass • x < 9000
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yield: P Z
Vx : yield» x > 0
\/x -.yield» x < 20000

real: PZ
Vx : real • x > 0
Vx : real • x < 13000

big Real: P Z
Vx : big Real • x > 0
Va; : big Real • x < 27000

coordinate : P Z
Vx : coordinate • x > —4000
Vx : coordinate • x < 4000

cmStates ::= startcruiseMissile \ preLaunchcruiseMissile \ flyingcruiseMissile

afStates ::= startairframe \ preLaunchairframe \ poweredFlightairframe
maneuveringairframe \ inertialFlightairframe

navStates ::= startnav I waitnav I readSensorsnav

135

fhghtDirectorStates ::= start flight Director | idleflightDirectar
maneuvering flightDirector

guidanceStates ::= startguidanceSystem \ idleguidanceSystem
processingguidanceSystem | terminalguidanceSysttern

throttleStates ::= startthrottle \ idlethrottle

warheadArmed ::= t \ f

engineStates ::= startengine | idleeng me

realWeight: P Z
Vz : realW eight • x > 0
Vx : realW eight • x < 100
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, vector
x : coordinate
y : coordinate
z : coordinate
magnitude : bigReal
true

.point.
vector
true

flight Path : P(seq point)

.position.
vector
true

route : P(seqposition)

.velocity
vector
true
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.acceleration,
vector
true

t

fuelTank
fuelLevel: bigReal
outputFlowRate : bigReal
fuelDensity : bigReal
true

.missileFuelT ank
fuelTank
fixedWeight : realWeight
tankW'eight: realW eight
capacity : bigReal
inputFlowRate : bigReal
((fixedWeight = (tankWeight + ((fuelDensity * capacity) div 2))) A
(inputFlowRate = 0))

.initializeMissileFuelT ank.
AmissileFuelTank
((fuelLevel' = capacity)
A (outputFlowRate' = 0))
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Theorem 1 initializeMissileFuelTankisok
3 missileFuelTank • initializeMissileFuelTank
prove by reduce; undo;
.changeFlow.
AmissileFuelTank
actual Flow Rate? : bigReal
(((((outputFlowRate' = actual Flow Rate?) A (fuelLevel' = fuelLevel))
A (capacity' = capacity)) A (tankWeighf = tankWeight)) A
(fuel Density' = fuelDensity))

Theorem 2 changeFlowisok
3 missileFuelTank • changeFlow
prove by reduce; undo;
.missileFuelTankinitMissileTank.
EmissileFuelTank
(fuelLevel > 0)

Theorem 3 missileFuelTankinitMissileTankisok
3 missileFuelTank • missileFuelTankinitMissileTank
prove by reduce; undo;
.missileFuelTankchangeTankFlow.
"EmissileFuelTank
true

Theorem 4 missileFuelTankchange TankFlowisok
3 missileFuelTank • missileFuelTankchangeTankFlow
prove by reduce; undo;
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.missileFuelT anktankEmpty.
"EmissileFuelTank
true

Theorem 5 missileFuelTanktankEmptyisok
3 missileFuelT ank • missileFuelT anktankEmpty
prove by reduce; undo;
.missileFuelT ankoutO fFuel.
'EmissileFuelTank
(fuelLevel — 0)

Theorem 6 missileFuelTankoutOfFuelisok
3 missileFuelT ank • missileFuelT ankoutOf Fuel
prove by reduce; undo;
.missileFuelT ankstart.
missileFuelT ank
true

Theorem 7 missileFuelTankstartisok
3 missileFuelT ank • missileFuelT ankstart
prove by reduce; undo;
.missileFuelT ankempty.
missileFuelT ank
true

Theorem 8 missileFuelTankernptyisok
3 missileFuelT ank • missileFuelT ankempty
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prove by reduce; undo;
, missileFuelTank full.
missileFuelTank
((fuelLevel = capacity) A {outputFlowRate — 0))

Theorem 9 missileFuelTankfullisok
3 missileFuelTank • missileFuelTank full
prove by reduce; undo;
.missileFuelT ankusing.
missileFuelT ank
{{{fuelLevel > 0) A {fuelLevel < capacity)) A {outputFlowRate > 0))

Theorem 10 missileFuelTankusingisok
3 missileFuelTank • missileFuelT ankusing
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 11 missileFuelTankstartTofullPreconditionHolds
3 missileFuelTank • true A true A initializeMissileFuelTank
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 12 missileFuelTankstartTofullImpliesNextlnvariant
3 missileFuelTank • true A true A initializeMissileFuelTank
=> {{fuelLevel' = capacity') A {outputFlowRate' = 0))
Theorem 13 missileFuelTankfullTousingPreconditionHolds
3 missileFuelTank • {{fuelLevel = capacity) A {outputFlowRate = 0)) A
true A changeFlow
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 14 missileFuelTankfullTousinglmpliesNextlnvariant
3 missileFuelTank • {{fuelLevel = capacity) A {outputFlowRate = 0)) A
true A changeFlow =» {{{fuelLevel' > 0) A {fuelLevel' < capacity')) A {output Flow Rat e'>
0))
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Theorem 15 missileFuelTankusingTousingPreconditionHolds
BmissileFuelTank • (((fuelLevel > 0) A (fuelLevel < capacity)) A (outputFlowRate >
0))
A true A changeFlow
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 16 missileFuelTankusingTousinglmpliesNextlnvariant
BmissileFuelTank • (((fuelLevel > 0) A (fuelLevel < capacity)) A (outputFlowRate >
0))
A true A changeFlow =» (((fuelLevel' > 0) A (fuelLevel' < capacity')) A
(outputFlowRate' > 0))
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 17 missileFuelTankusingToemptyPreconditionHolds
BmissileFuelTank • (((fuelLevel > 0) A (fuelLevel < capacity)) A
(outputFlowRate > 0)) A true A changeFlow
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 18 missileFuelTankusingToemptylmpliesNextlnvariant
BmissileFuelTank • (((fuelLevel > 0) A (fuelLevel < capacity)) A
(outputFlowRate > 0)) A £rue A changeFlow => true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 19 missileFuelTankusingToemptylmpliesSendlnvariants
BmissileFuelTank • (((fuelLevel > 0) A (fuelLevel < capacity)) A
(outputFlowRate > 0)) A true A changeFlow => (fuelLevel = 0)
prove by reduce; undo;
.navigationSystem.
navState : navStates
true

. navigationSy steminit NavigationSy stem.
"EnavigationSy stem
true
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Theorem 20 navigationSysteminitNavigationSystemisok
3 navigationSystem • navigationSysteminitNavigationSystem
prove by reduce; undo;
. navigationSy stemupdateP'osition.
EnavigationSy stem
true

Theorem 21 navigationSystemupdatePositionisok
3 navigationSystem • navigationSy stemupdateP osition
prove by reduce; undo;
navigationSy stemestimateP osition.
"EnavigationSy stem
true

Theorem 22 navigationSystemestimatePositionisok
3 navigationSystem • navigationSy stemestimateP osition
prove by reduce; undo;
.navigationSystemAUTOMATIC.
EnavigationSy stem
true

Theorem 23 navigationSystemAUTOMATICisok
3 navigationSystem • navigationSystemAUTOMATIC
prove by reduce; undo;
.navigationSy stemstart.
navigationSystem
true
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Theorem 24 navigationSystemstartisok
3 navigationSystem • navigationSystemstart
prove by reduce; undo;
.navigationSystemwait.
navigationSystem
true

Theorem 25 navigationSystemwaitisok
3 navigationSystem • navigationSystemwait
prove by reduce; undo;
! navigationSystemreadSensors.
navigationSystem
true

Theorem 26 navigationSystemreadSensorsisok
3 navigationSystem • navigationSystemreadSensors
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 27 navigationSystemstartTowaitPreconditionHolds
3 navigationSystem • true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 28 navigationSystemstartTowaitlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 navigationSystem • true A true =>• true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 29 navigationSystemwaitToreadSensorsPreconditionHolds
3 navigationSystem • true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 30 navigationSystemwaitToreadSensorsImpliesNextlnvariant
3 navigationSystem • true A true =*> true
prove by reduce; undo;
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Theorem 31 navigationSystemreadSensorsTowaitPreconditionHolds
3 navigationSystem • true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 32 navigationSystemreadSensors TowaitlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 navigationSystem • true A true =>- 2rue
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 33 navigationSystemreadSensorsTowaitlmpliesSendlnvariants
3 navigationSystem • true A true =$■ true
prove by reduce; undo;
flightProfile.
timeOnTarget: time
wayPoints : flightPath
true

.addP ointT oRoute.
AflightProfile
pi : point
[wayPoints' = wayPoints"'pi)
Theorem 34 addPointToRouteisok
3 flightProfile • addPointToRoute
prove by reduce; undo;
, remove Point From Route.
AflightProfile
(wayPoints' — wayPoints)
Theorem 35 removePointFromRouteisok
3 flightProfile • remove Point From Route
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prove by reduce; undo;
.flightProfileinitFlightProfile.
E flightPro file
true
Theorem 36 flightProfileinitFlightProfileisok
3 flightProfile • flightProfileinitFlightProfile
prove by reduce; undo;
. flight Pro fileaddW ay Point.

'EflightProfile
true
Theorem 37 flightProfileaddWayPointisok
3 flightProfile • flightPro fileaddW ay Point
prove by reduce; undo;
. flightPro filer emoveFirstW ay Point.
"EflightProfile
true
Theorem 38 flightProfileremoveFirstWayPointisok
3 flightProfile • flightProfileremoveFirstWayPoint
prove by reduce; undo;
! flightPro filestart.
flightProfile
true
Theorem 39 flightProfilestartisok
3 flightProfile • flightProfilestart
146

prove by reduce; undo;
. f light Profileidle.
flightProfile
true

Theorem 40 flightProfileidleisok
3 flightProfile • flightProfileidle
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 41 flightProfilestartToidlePreconditionHolds
3 flightProfile • true A true A addPointToRoute
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 42 flightProfilestartToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 flightProfile • true A true A addP ointT oRoute =$► true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 43 flightProfileidleToidlePreconditionHolds
3 flightProfile • true A true A addP ointT oRoute
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 44 flightProfileidleToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 flightProfile • true A true A addP ointT oRoute ^ true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 45 flightProfileidleToidlePreconditionHolds
3 flightProfile • true A true A remove Point From Route
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 46 flightProfileidleToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 flightProfile • true A true A removePointFromRoute =>• true
prove by reduce; undo;
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! guidanceSystem

__

profile : flightProfile
wayPoints : flightPath
guidanceState : guidanceStates
chronometer : timer
true

t

initializeGuidanceSystem.
AguidanceSystem
((chronometer' = 0) A (guidanceState' = startGuidanceSystem))

Theorem 47 initializeGuidanceSystemisok
3 guidanceSystem • initializeGuidanceSystem
prove by reduce; undo;
. guidances'ysteminitGuidanceSystem.
EguidanceSystem
true

Theorem 48 guidanceSysteminitGuidanceSystemisok
3 guidanceSystem • guidances ysteminitGuidanceSy stem
prove by reduce; undo;
. guidances ystemdoLaunch.
EguidanceSystem
true

Theorem 49 guidanceSystemdoLaunchisok
3 guidanceSystem • guidances ystemdoLaunch
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prove by reduce; undo;
.guidanceSystemestimatePosition.
"EiguidanceSystem
true
Theorem 50 guidanceSystemestimatePositionisok
3 guidancesystem • guidanceSystemestimatePosition
prove by reduce; undo;
.guidanceSystemoutOfFuel.
"BguidanceSystem
true
Theorem 51 guidanceSystemoutOfFuelisok
3 guidances'ystem • guidanceSystemoutOfFuel
prove by reduce; undo;
.guidanceSystemarmMissile.
"E^guidanceS y stem
true
Theorem 52 guidanceSystemarmMissileisok
3 guidanceSystem • guidanceSystemarmMissile
prove by reduce; undo;
I_guidanceSystemupdatePosition.

'EguidanceSystem
true
Theorem 53 guidanceSystemupdatePositionisok
3 guidanceSystem • guidanceSystemupdatePosition
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prove by reduce; undo;
.guidanceSystemremoveFirstWay Point,
^guidance System
true

Theorem 54 guidanceSystemremoveFirstWayPointisok
3 guidances y stem • guidanceSystemremoveFirstWay Point
prove by reduce; undo;
.guidanceSystemAUTOMATIC.
'EguidanceSystem
true

Theorem 55 guidanceSystemAUTOMATICisok
3 guidancesystem • guidanceSystemAUTOMATIC
prove by reduce; undo;
.guidanceSystemstart.
guidances y stem
true

Theorem 56 guidanceSystemstartisok
3 guidance System • guidanceSystemstart
prove by reduce; undo;
.guidanceSystemidle.
guidances y stem
true

Theorem 57 guidanceSystemidleisok
3 guidanceSystem • guidanceSystemidle
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prove by reduce; undo;
.guidanceSystemprocessing.
guidanceSystem
true
Theorem 58 guidanceSystemprocessingisok
3 guidanceSystem • guidanceSystemprocessing
prove by reduce; undo;
. guidances y stemterminal.
guidanceSystem
true
Theorem 59 guidanceSystemterminalisok
3 guidanceSystem • guidanceSystemterminal
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 60 guidanceSystemstartToidlePreconditionHolds
3 guidanceSystem • true A true A initializeGuidanceSystem
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 61 guidanceSystemstartToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 guidanceSystem • true A true A initializeGuidanceSystem =>- true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 62 guidanceSystemidleToidlePreconditionHolds
3 guidanceSystem • true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 63 guidanceSystemidleToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 guidanceSystem • true A true => true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 64 guidanceSystemidleToidlelrnpliesSendlnvariants
3 guidanceSystem • true A true => true
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prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 65 guidanceSystemidleToprocessingPreconditionHolds
3 guidances'ystem • true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 66 guidanceSystemidle ToprocessinglmpliesNextlnvariant
3 guidance System • true A true =>• true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 67 guidanceSystemidleToterminalPreconditionHolds
3 guidanceSystem • true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 68 guidanceSystemidle ToterminallmpliesNextlnvariant
3 guidanceSystem • true A true =>• true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 69 guidanceSystemidle ToterminallmpliesSendlnvariants
3 guidanceSystem • true A true =>• true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 70 guidanceSystemprocessingToterminalPreconditionHolds
3 guidanceSystem • true A {projilt.route head = profile.route tail)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 71 guidanceSystemprocessingToterminallmpliesNextlnvariant
3 guidanceSystem • true A (profile.route head = profile.route tail)
=$■ true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 72 guidanceSystemprocessingToterminallmpliesSendlnvariants
3 guidanceSystem • true A (profile.route head = profile.route tail)
=4> true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 73 guidanceSystemprocessingToidlePreconditionHolds
3 guidanceSystem • true A (profile.route head - profile.route tail)
prove by reduce; undo;
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Theorem 74 guidanceSystemprocessingToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 guidanceSystem • true A (profile.route head = profile.route tail)
=£• true
prove by reduce; undo;
flight Director

—

flight Director'State : flightDirector States
true

.initializeFlightDirector.
A flight Director
(flightDirector State' = idle flightDirector)

Theorem 75 initializeFlightDirectorisok
3 flightDirector • initializeFlightDirector
prove by reduce; undo;
.flightDirector err or Signals.
E flightDirector
true

Theorem 76 flightDirectorerrorSignalsisok
3 flightDirector • flightDirector errorSignals
prove by reduce; undo;
.flightDirectorinitFlightDirector.
E flightDirector
true

Theorem 77 flightDirectorinitFlightDirectorisok
3 flightDirector • flightDirectorinitFlightDirector
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prove by reduce; undo;
.flightDirectormaneuverComplete.
EflightDirector
true
Theorem 78 flightDirectormaneuverCompleteisok
3 flightDirector • flightDirectormaneuverComplete
prove by reduce; undo;
.flightDirectorchangeCourse.
EflightDirector
true
Theorem 79 flightDirectorchangeCourseisok
3 flightDirector • flightDirectorchangeCourse
prove by reduce; undo;
. flightDirectorsetElevation.
EflightDirector
true
Theorem 80 flightDirectorsetElevationisok
3 flightDirector • flightDirector setElevation
prove by reduce; undo;
. flightDirectorsetThrottle.
EflightDirector
true
Theorem 81 flightDirectorsetThrottleisok
3 flightDirector • flightDirector setThrottle
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prove by reduce; undo;
flight Director start.
flight Director
(flightDirector State = start flightDirector)

Theorem 82 flightDirectorstartisok
3 flightDirector • flightDirector start
prove by reduce; undo;
flightDirectoridle.
flightDirector
{flightDirector State = idleflightDirector)

Theorem 83 flightDirectoridleisok
3 flightDirector • flightDirectoridle
prove by reduce; undo;
. flightDirectormaneuvering.
flightDirector
(flightDirectorState = maneuvering flightDirector)

Theorem 84 flightDirectormaneuveringisok
3 flightDirector • flightDirectormaneuvering
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 85 flightDirectorstartToidlePreconditionHolds
3 flightDirector • (flightDirectorState = start flightDirector) A true
A initializeFlightDirector
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 86 flightDirectorstartToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 flightDirector • (flightDirectorState = start flightDirector) A true A
initializeFlightDirector =^ (flightDirectorState' = idleflightDirector)
155

prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 87 flightDirectoridle TomaneuveringPreconditionHolds
3 flightDirector • [flight Director State - idleflightDirector) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 88 flightDirectoridle TomaneuveringlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 flightDirector • {flightDirectorState = idleflightDirector) A true
=> (flightDirector State' = maneuvering flightDirector)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 89 flightDirectoridle TomaneuveringlmpliesSendlnvariants
3 flightDirector • (flightDirectorState = idleflightDirector) A true
=> true A true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 90 flightDirectormaneuveringToidlePreconditionHolds
3 flightDirector • (flightDirectorState = maneuvering flightDirector) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 91 flightDirectormaneuveringToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 flightDirector • (flightDirectorState = maneuvering flightDirector) A true
=£> (flightDirectorState' = idleflightDirector)
prove by reduce; undo;
avionicsSoftware.
navSys : navigationSystem
guidSys : guidanceSystem
director : flightDirector
true

.initializeAvionicsSoftware.
AavionicsSoftware
true
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Theorem 92 initializeAvionicsSoftwareisok
3 avionicsSoftware • initializeAvionicsSoftware
prove by reduce; undo;
.avionicsSoftwareinitNavigationSystem.
EavionicsSoftware
true

Theorem 93 avionicsSoftwareinitNavigationSystemisok
3 avionicsSoftware • avionicsSoftwareinitNavigationSystem
prove by reduce; undo;
.avionicsSoftwareinitGuidanceSystem.
'EavionicsSoftware
true

Theorem 94 avionicsSoftwareinitGuidanceSystemisok
3 avionicsSoftware • avionicsSoftwareinitGuidanceSystem
prove by reduce; undo;
.avionicsSoftwareinitFlight Director.
EavionicsSoftware
true

Theorem 95 avionicsSoftwareinitFlighWirectorisok
3 avionicsSoftware • avionicsSoftwareinitFlightDirector
prove by reduce; undo;
.avionicsSoftwarestart.
avionicsSoftware
true
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Theorem 96 avionicsSoftwarestartisok
3 avionicsSoftware • avionicsSoftwarestart
prove by reduce; undo;
.avionicsSoftwar eavionicsSoftwarelnitialized.
avionicsSoftware
true

Theorem 97 avionicsSoflwareavionicsSoftwarelnitializedisok
3 avionicsSoftware • avionicsSoftwareavionicsSoftwarelnitialized
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 98 avionicsSoftwarestartToavionicsSoftwarelnitializedPreconditionHolds
3 avionicsSoftware • true A true A initialize AvionicsSoftware
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 99 avionicsSoftwarestart ToavionicsSoftwarelnitializedlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 avionicsSoftware • true A irue A initializeAvionicsSoftware =$■ true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 100 avionicsSofiwarestartToavionicsSoftwarelnitializedlmpliesSendlnvariants
3 avionicsSoftware • true A true A initializeAvionicsSoftware => irue A true A
prove by reduce; undo;
inarh.pn.d

weight : mass
munitionType : string
ex plosive Force : yield
armed : warhea dArmed
{{weight > 0) A {explosiv eForce > 0))
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.initializeWarhead.
Awarhead
{warheadArmed' = /)

Theorem 101 initializeWarheadisok
3 warhead • initializeW arhead
prove by reduce; undo;
.armWarhead.
Awarhead
(war headArmed' = t)

Theorem 102 armWarheadisok
3 warhead • armWarhead
prove by reduce; undo;
.warheadinitWarhead.
E.warhead
true

Theorem 103 warheadinitWarheadisok
3 warhead • warheadinitW arhead
prove by reduce; undo;
-warheadarmMissile.
Ewarhead
true

Theorem 104 warheadarmMissileisok
3 warhead • warheadarmMissile
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prove by reduce; undo;
.warheadstart.
warhead
true

Theorem 105 warheadstartisok
3 warhead • warheadstart
prove by reduce; undo;
.warheadunarmed.
warhead
(warheadArmed — f)

Theorem 106 warheadunarmedisok
3 warhead • warheadunarmed
prove by reduce; undo;
.warheadarmed.
warhead
{warheadArmed = i)

Theorem 107 warheadarmedisok
3 warhead • warheadarmed
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 108 warheadstartTounarmedPreconditionHolds
3 warhead • true A true A initializeWarhead
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 109 warheadstartTounarmedlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 warhead • true A true A initializeWarhead => (warheadArmed' = f)
prove by reduce; undo;
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Theorem 110 warheadunarmedToarmedPreconditionHolds
3 warhead • (warheadArmed = /) A true A armWarhead
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 111 warheadunarmedToarmedlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 warhead • (warheadArmed = /) A true A armWarhead => (warheadArmed'
= t)
prove by reduce; undo;
air frame.
pos : position
accl : acceleration
vel : velocity
af State : af States
heading : real
elevation : real
((((heading < (2 * pi)) A (heading > 0)) A (elevation < (pi div 2))) A
(elevation > (pi div 2)))

, setPosition
Aairframe
setPosXl : coordinate
setPosYI : coordinate
setPosZI : coordinate
(((pos.x = setPosXI) A (pos.y = setPosYI)) A (pos.z = setPosZl))

Theorem 112 setPositionisok
3 air frame • setPosition
prove by reduce; undo;
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.set Heading
Aairframe
setHeadl : real
(heading = setHeadl)

Theorem 113 setHeadingisok
3 air frame • setHeading
prove by reduce; undo;
.setElevation.
Aairframe
setElel : real
(elevation = setElel)

Theorem 114 setElevationisok
3 air frame • setElevation
prove by reduce; undo;
.calculateDistances.
Aairframe
posll : position
pos21 : position
true

Theorem 115 calculateDistancesisok
3 air frame • calculateDistances
prove by reduce; undo;
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.initialize Air frame.
Aairframe
(((((((((((elevation' = (pi div 2)) A (heading' = 0)) A (pos.x = 0)) A
(pos.y = 0)) A (pos.z = 0)) A (vel.x = 0)) A (vel.y = 0)) A
(vel.z = 0)) A (accl.x = 0)) A (accly = 0)) A (accl.z = 0))
Theorem 116 initializeAirframeisok
3 air frame • initialize Air frame
prove by reduce; undo;
.setPosition.
Aairframe
true
Theorem 117 setPositionisok
3 air frame • setPosition
prove by reduce; undo;
. air frameinit Air frame.
'Bair frame
true
Theorem 118 airframeinitAirframeisok
3 air frame • air frameinit Air frame
prove by reduce; undo;
. air framedoLaunch.
Hair frame
true
Theorem 119 airframedoLaunchisok
3 air frame • air framedoLaunch
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prove by reduce; undo;
! air frametank Empty.
Eairframe
true

Theorem 120 airframetankEmptyisok
3 air frame • air frametankEmpty
prove by reduce; undo;
. air frameestimatePosition.
"Eairframe
true

Theorem 121 airframeestimatePositionisok
3 air frame • air frameestimatePosition
prove by reduce; undo;
.airframechangeCourse.
"Eairframe
true

Theorem 122 airframechangeCourseisok
3 air frame • airframechangeCourse
prove by reduce; undo;
! air framedoM aneuverC omplete.
Eairframe
true

Theorem 123 airframedoManeuverCompleteisok
3 air frame • air f ramedoM aneuverC omplete
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prove by reduce; undo;
. air frameoutO fFuel.
Hair frame
true

Theorem 124 airframeoutOfFuelisok
3 air frame • air frameoutO f Fuel
prove by reduce; undo;
.air f ramestart.
air frame
(af'State — startair frame)

Theorem 125 airframestartisok
3 air frame • air f ramestart
prove by reduce; undo;
, airframepreLaunch.
airframe
{a f State = preLaunchair frame)

Theorem 126 airframepreLaunchisok
3 airframe • airframepreLaunch
prove by reduce; undo;
! air framepoweredFlight.
airframe
(af State = poweredFlightair frame)

Theorem 127 airframepoweredFlightisok
3 airframe • airframepoweredFlight
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prove by reduce; undo;
.airframemaneuvering.
airframe
(a f State = maneuveringair frame)

Theorem 128 airframemaneuveringisok
3 airframe • airframemaneuvering
prove by reduce; undo;
, air frameinertial Flight.
airframe
(a f'State = inertialFlightair frame)

Theorem 129 airframeinertialFlightisok
3 airframe • airframeinertialFlight
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 130 airframestartTopreLaunchPreconditionHolds
3 airframe • (a f State = startair frame) A true A initialize Air frame
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 131 airframestartTopreLaunchlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 airframe • (a f State = startair frame) A true A initialize Air frame (a f State' = preLaunchair frame)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 132 airframepreLaunch TopoweredFlightPreconditionHolds
3 airframe • (a fState = preLaunchair frame) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 133 airframepreLaunch TopoweredFlightlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 airframe • (a f State = preLaunchair frame) A true =>
(af State' = poweredFlightairframe)
prove by reduce; undo;
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Theorem 134 airframepoweredFlight ToinertialFlightPreconditionHolds
3 air frame • (a f State = power edF light air frame) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 135 airframepoweredFlightToinertialFlightlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 air frame • (a f State = poweredFlightair frame) A true =>
(a f State' = inertia! Flightair frame)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 136 airframepoweredFlightTopoweredFlightPreconditionHolds
3 air frame • (a f State = poweredFlightair frame) A true A setPosition
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 137 airframepoweredFlight TopoweredFlightlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 air frame • (a f State - poweredFlightair frame) A true A setPosition =>
(af State' = poweredFlightair frame)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 138 airframepoweredFUghtTomaneuveringPreconditionHolds
3 air frame • (a f State = poweredFlightair frame) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 139 airframepoweredFlightTomaneuveringlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 air frame • (a f State - poweredFlightair frame) A true =$■
(af State' = maneuveringair frame)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 140 airframemaneuveringTopoweredFlightPreconditionHolds
3 air frame • (a f State = maneuveringair frame) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 141 airframemaneuveringTopoweredFlightlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 air frame • (a f State = maneuveringair frame) A true =>>
(a f State' = poweredFlightair frame)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 142 airframemaneuveringToinertialFlightPreconditionHolds
3 air frame • (a f State = maneuveringair frame) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
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Theorem 143 airframemaneuveringToinertialFlightlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 air frame • (a f State = maneuvering air frame) A true =>•
(a f State' = inertialFlightair frame)
prove by reduce; undo;
, throttle.
fuelFlow : real
throttleState : throttleStates
maximumFlowRate : real
actual Flow Rate : real
true

. changeFuelFlow.
Athrottle
inFlowl : real
(fuelFlow = inFlowl)

Theorem 144 changeFuelFlowisok
3 throttle • changeFuelFlow
prove by reduce; undo;
.throttleinitT hrottle.
'Ethrottle
true

Theorem 145 throttleinitThrottleisok
3 throttle • throttleinitT hrottle
prove by reduce; undo;
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.throttlechangeT ankFlow.
Ethrottle
true

Theorem 146 throttlechangeTankFlowisok
3 throttle • throttlechangeT ankFlow
prove by reduce; undo;
.throttlesetThrottle.
Ethrottle
true

Theorem 147 throttlesetThrottleisok
3 throttle • throttlesetThrottle
prove by reduce; undo;
.throttlestart.
throttle
(throttleState = startthrottle)

Theorem 148 throttlestartisok
3 throttle • throttlestart
prove by reduce; undo;
, throttleidle.
throttle
(throttleState = idlethrottle)

Theorem 149 throttleidleisok
3 throttle • throttleidle
prove by reduce; undo;
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Theorem 150 throttlestartToidlePreconditionHolds
3 throttle • (throttleState = startthrottle) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 151 throttlestartToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 throttle • (throttleState = startthrottle) A true => (throttleState' =
idlethrottle)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 152 throttleidleToidlePreconditionHolds
3throttle • (throttleState = idlethrottle) A changeFuelFlow
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 153 throttleidleToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3throttle • (throttleState = idlethrottle) A changeFuelFlow =» (throttleState'
= idlethrottle)
prove by reduce; undo;
jetEngine.
thrust : real
maximum Fuel Flow Rate : real
current Fuel Flow Rate : real
engineState : engineStates
true

_j etEngineinitEngine.
3jetEngine
true

Theorem 154 jetEngineinitEngineisok
3 jetEngine • jetEngineinitEngine
prove by reduce; undo;
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.jetEnginechangeTankFlow.
Hjet Engine
true
Theorem 155 jetEnginechangeTankFlowisok
BjetEngine • jetEnginechangeTankFlow
prove by reduce; undo;
t

jetEnginestart.
jet Engine
(engineState = startengine)

Theorem 156 jetEnginestartisok
BjetEngine • jetEnginestart
prove by reduce; undo;
! jetEngineidle.
jet Engine
(engineState = idleengine)
Theorem 157 jetEngineidleisok
BjetEngine • jetEngineidle
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 158 jetEnginestartToidlePreconditionHolds
BjetEngine • (engineState — startengine) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 159 jetEnginestartToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
BjetEngine • (engineState = startengine) A true => (engineState' = idleengine)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 160 jetEngineidleToidlePreconditionHolds
BjetEngine • (engineState = idleengine)
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prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 161 jetEngineidleToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
BjetEngine • (engineState - idleengine) =>■ (engineState' - idleengine)
prove by reduce; undo;
propulsion System.
fuelFeed: throttle
engine : jetEngine
tank : missileFuelTank
((((tank, fuel Lev el = 0) =*> (fuelFeed.maximumFlowRate = 0)) A
((tank, fuel Lev el > 0) => (fuelFeed.maximumFlowRate =
engine.maximumFuelFlowRate))) A
(engine.currentFuelFlowRate = fuelFeed.actualFlowRate))

.propulsionSysteminitPropulsionSystem.
'E.propulsionSystem
true
Theorem 162 propulsionSysteminitPropulsionSystemisok
3propulsionSystem • propulsionSysteminitPropulsionSystem
prove by reduce; undo;
.propulsionSysteminitThrottle.
'EpropulsionSystem
true
Theorem 163 propulsionSysteminitThrottleisok
3 propulsionSystem • propulsionSysteminitThrottle
prove by reduce; undo;
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.propulsionSysteminitEngine.
'EpropulsionSy stem
true

Theorem 164 propulsionSysteminitEngineisok
3 propulsionSystem • propulsionSysteminitEngine
prove by reduce; undo;
.propulsionSy steminitMissileFuelTank.
^propulsionSystem
true
Theorem 165 propulsionSysteminitMissileFuelTankisok
3 propulsionSystem • propulsionSysteminitMissileFuelTank
prove by reduce; undo;
propulsionSy stemstart.
propulsionSystem
true

Theorem 166 propulsionSystemstartisok
3 propulsionSystem • propulsionSy stemstart
prove by reduce; undo;
.propulsionSy stemidle.
propulsionSystem
true

Theorem 167 propulsionSystemidleisok
3 propulsionSystem • propulsionSy stemidle
prove by reduce; undo;
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Theorem 168 propulsionSystemstartToidlePreconditionHolds
3 propulsionSystem • true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 169 propulsionSystemstartToidlelmpliesNextlnvariant
3 propulsionSystem • true A true =4> true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 170 propulsionSystemstartToidlelmpliesSendlnvariants
3 propulsionSystem • true A true =>■ true A true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
.cruiseMissile.
propulsion : propulsionSystem
frame : air frame
payload : warhead
avionics : avionicsSoftware
cmState : cmStates
true

.initializeCruiseMissile.
AcruiseMissile
(cmState' = preLaunchcruiseMissile)

Theorem 171 initializeCruiseMissileisok
3 cruiseMissile • initializeCruiseMissile
prove by reduce; undo;
.cruiseMissiledoLaunch.
'EcruiseMissile
true
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Theorem 172 cruiseMissikdoLaunchisok
d cruiseMissile • cruiseMissiledoLaunch
prove by reduce; undo;
. cruiseMissilelaunch.
EcruiseMissile
true

Theorem 173 cruiseMissiklaunchisok
d cruiseMissile • cruiseMissilelaunch
prove by reduce; undo;

-cruiseMissileinitPropulsionSystem.
'EcruiseMissile
true

Theorem 174 cruiseMissileinitPropulsionSystemisok
d cruiseMissile • cruiseMissileinitPropulsionSystem
prove by reduce; undo;
-cruiseMissileinit Air frame.
IcruiseMissile
true

Theorem 175 cruiseMissileinitAirframeisok
d cruiseMissile • cruiseMissileinit Air frame
prove by reduce; undo;
-cruiseMissileinitWarhead.
"EcruiseMissile
true
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Theorem 176 cruiseMissileinitWarheadisok
3 cruiseMissile • cruiseMissileinitWarhead
prove by reduce; undo;
.cruiseMissileinitAvionicsSoftware.
EcruiseMissile
true

Theorem 177 cruiseMissileinitAvionicsSoftwareisok
3 cruiseMissile • cruiseMissileinitAvionicsSoftware
prove by reduce; undo;
.cruiseMissileAUTOMATIC.
'EcruiseMissile
true

Theorem 178 cruiseMissileAUTOMATICisok
3 cruiseMissile • cruiseMissileAUTOMATIC
prove by reduce; undo;
.cruiseMissilestart.
cruiseMissile
(cmState = startcruiseMissile)

Theorem 179 cruiseMissilestartisok
3 cruiseMissile • cruiseMissilestart
prove by reduce; undo;
.cruiseMissilepreLaunch.
cruiseMissile
(cmState = preLaunchcruiseMissile)
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Theorem 180 cruiseMissilepreLaunchisok
3 cruiseMissile • cruiseMissilepreLaunch
prove by reduce; undo;
.cruiseMissile flying.
cruiseMissile
(cmState — flyingcruiseMissile)

Theorem 181 cruiseMissileflyingisok
3 cruiseMissile • cruiseMissile flying
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 182 cruiseMissilestartTopreLaunchPreconditionHolds
3 cruiseMissile • (cmState = startcruiseMissile) A true A initializeCruiseMissile
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 183 cruiseMissilestartTopreLaunchlmpliesNextlnvariant
3 cruiseMissile • (cmState = startcruiseMissile) A true A initializeCruiseMissile
=>■ (cmState' = preLaunchcruiseMissile)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 184 cruiseMissilestartTopreLaunchlmpliesSendlnvariants
3 cruiseMissile • (cmState = startcruiseMissile) A true A initializeCruiseMissile
=>• true A true A true A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 185 cruiseMissilepreLaunch ToflyingPreconditionHolds
3 cruiseMissile • (cmState = preLaunchcruiseMissile) A true
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 186 cruiseMissilepreLaunch ToflyinglmpliesNextlnvariant
3 cruiseMissile • (cmState = preLaunchcruiseMissile) A true => (cmState' =
flyingcruiseMissile)
prove by reduce; undo;
Theorem 187 cruiseMissilepreLaunch ToflyinglmpliesSendlnvariants
3 cruiseMissile • (cmState = preLaunchcruiseMissile) A true =>■ true
prove by reduce; undo;
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Appendix D. Promela Specification of Cruise Missile Model
»define true 1
«define false 0
»define AUTOMATIC true

mtype = { initMissileTank,
initNavigationSystem,
initFlightProfile,

changeTankFlow,

updatePosition,

addWayPoint,

tankEmpty,

estimatePosition,

removeFirstWayPoint,

initGuidanceSystem,

doLaunch,

initFlightDirector,

maneuverComplete, changeCourse,

setThrottle,

initWarhead,

initThrottle,

initEngine,

launch,

outOfFuel,

armMissile,

initAirframe,

errorSignals,

doManeuverComplete,

initPropulsionSystem,

initAvionicsSoftware };

chan mapO = [0] of {mtype};
chan mapl = [0] of {mtype};
chan map2 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map3 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map4 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map5 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map6 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map7 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map8 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map9 = [0] of {mtype};
chan maplO = [0] of {mtype};
chan mapll = [0] of {mtype};
chan mapl2 = [0] of {mtype};
chan mapi3 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map!4 = [0] of {mtype};
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setElevation,

initMissileFuelTank,

chan mapl5 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map16 = [0] of {mtype};
chan mapl7 = [0] of {mtype};
chan mapl8 = [0] of {mtype};
chan mapl9 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map20 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map21 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map22 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map23 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map24 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map25 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map26 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map27 = [0] of {mtype};
chan map28 = [0] of {mtype};

proctype missileFuelTankO
{
goto startState;
startState:
do
:: atomic{map26?initMissileTank; true ->} /* initializeMissileFuelTank;*/
goto fullState
od;

emptyState:
do
:: true -> break
od;

fullState:
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do
:: atomic{mapi?changeTankFlow; true ->} /* changeFlow; */ goto usingState
od;

usingState:
do
:: atomic{mapl?changeTankFlow; true ->} /* changeFlow; */ goto usingState
:: atomic{map2?tankEmpty; true ->} map3!out0fFuel; /* changeFlow; */
goto emptyState
od;
}

proctype navigationSystemO
{
goto startState;
startState:
do
:: atomic{map4?initNavigationSystem; true ->}

goto waitState

od;

waitState:
do
:: atomic{map5?updatePosition; true ->}

goto readSensorsState

od;

readSensorsState:
do
:: atomic{AUTOMATIC; true ->} map6!estimatePosition;
od;
}
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goto waitState

proctype flightProfile()
{
goto startState;
startState:
do
:: atomic{mapl5?initFlightProfile; true ->} /* addPointToRoute; */
goto idleState
od;

idleState:
do
:: atomic{map9?addWayPoint; true ->} /* addPointToRoute; */
goto idleState
:: atomic{maplO?removeFirstWayPoint; true ->} /* removePointFromRoute; */
goto idleState
od;
}

proctype guidanceSystemO
■C

goto startState;
startState:
do
:: atomic{mapll?initGuidanceSystem; true ->} /* initializeGuidanceSystem;
*/

goto idleState

od;

idleState:
do
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:: atomic{mapl2?doLaunch; true ->} map5!updatePosition;
goto idleState
:: atomic{map6?estimatePosition; true ->}

goto processingState

:: atomic{map4?out0fFuel; true ->} map5!updatePosition;
goto terminalState
od;

processingState:
do
:: atomic{AUTOMATIC; /* profile.route'head = profile.route'tail -> */}
maplOlremoveFirstWayPoint; mapl3!armMissile;
:: atomic{AUTOMATIC;

goto terminalState

/* \lnot profile.route'head =

profile.route'tail -> */}

goto idleState

od;

terminalState:
do
:: break
od;
}

proctype flightDirectorO
{
goto startState;
startState:
do
:: atomic{mapi5?initFlightDirector; true ->} /*
initializeFlightDirector; */

goto idleState

od;
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idleState:
do
:: atomic{mapl5?errorSignals; true ->> mapi7!changeCourse;
mapl8!setElevation; mapl9!setThrottle; goto maneuveringState
od;

maneuveringState:
do
:: atomic{mapl6?maneuverComplete; true ->}

goto idleState

od;
}

proctype avionicsSoftwareO
{
goto startState;
startState:
do
:: atomic{map28?initAvionicsSoftware; true ->} map4!initNavigationSystem;
mapil!initGuidanceSystem; mapl5!initFlightDirector;
/* initializeAvionicsSoftware; */ goto avionicsSoftwarelnitializedState
od;

avionicsSoftwarelnitializedState:
do
:: break
od;
}

proctype warhead()
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goto startState;
startState:
do
:: atomic{map21?initWarhead; true ->} /* initializeWarhead; */
goto unarmedState
od;

unarmedState:
do
:: atomic{mapl3?armMissile; true ->} /* armWarhead; */
od;

armedState:
do
:: break
od;
}

proctype airframeO
■C

goto startState;
startState:
do
:: map21?initAirframe; true -> /* initializeAirframe; */
goto preLaunchState
od;

preLaunchState:
do
:: mapl2?doLaunch; true ->

goto poweredFlightState
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goto armedState

od;

poweredFlightState:
do
:: map3?out0fFuel; true ->

goto inertialFlightState

:: map6?estimatePosition; true -> /* setPosition; */
goto poweredFlightState
:: mapl7?changeCourse; true ->

goto maneuveringState

od;

maneuveringState:
do
:: map22?doManeuverComplete; true ->
:: map3?out0fFuel; true ->

goto poweredFlightState

goto inertialFlightState

od;

inertialFlightState:
do
: : break
od;
}

proctype throttle()
{
goto startState;
startState:
do
:: map23?initThrottle; true ->

goto idleState

od;
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idlestate:
do
:: map20?setThrottle -> map28!changeTankFlow; /* changeFuelFlow; */
goto idleState
od;
}

proctype jetEngineO
{
goto startState;
startState:
do
:: map24?initEngine; true ->

goto idleState

od;

idleState:
do
:: map1?changeTankFlow ->

goto idleState

od;
}

proctype propulsionSystemO
{
goto startState;
startState:
do
:: map25?initPropulsionSystem; true -> map23!initThrottle;
map24!initEngine; map26!initMissileFuelTank; goto idleState
od;
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idleState:
do
:: break
od;
}

proctype cruiseMissileO
{
goto startState;
startState:
do
:: AUTOMATIC; true -> map25!initPropulsionSystem; map21!initAirframe;
map20!initWarhead; map28!initAvionicsSoftware;
/* initializeCruiseMissile; */ goto preLaunchState
od;

preLaunchState:
do
:: map27?launch; true -> mapl2!doLaunch;
od;

flyingState:
do
:: break;
od;
}

init
{
atomic{ run missileFuelTankO ;
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goto flyingState

run navigationSystemO ;
run flightProfileO;
run guidanceSystemO;
run flightDirectorO;
run avionicsSoftwareO;
run warhead();
run airframeO;
run throttle();
run jetEngineO ;
run propulsionSystemO ;
run cruiseMissileO };
}
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